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Only a few Supreme Court decisions have so profoundly impacted 
the criminal justice system that they changed the day-to-day conduct 
and/or strategy of prosecutors, police, defense counsel, and judges. 
The Warren Court provided most of these select few cases, such as 
Mapp v. Ohio, I Gideon v. Wainwright, 2 and Miranda v. Arizona. 3 
More recently, in 2004 Crawford v. Washington 4 sent shockwaves 
through police departments and courthouses. Greatly expanding the 
right to confrontation, Crawford requires live testimony, subject to 
cross-examination, and generally rejects the use of "testimonial 
hearsay."s 
Crawford significantly decreased prosecutorial use of hearsay 
statements of unavailable witnesses. 6 As a result, prosecutors argue, 
with increasing frequency, that the defendant procured witness 
unavailability through intimidation, coercion, and/or violence, and as 
such, forfeited the right to Crawford confrontation. 7 
This article focuses on how courts resolve prosecutorial allegations 
of "forfeiture by wrongdoing"S and the extent to which Crawford 
itself may dictate the procedure for forfeiture/waiver determinations. 
Maryland is the only jurisdiction that takes a defense-oriented, pro-
confrontation position on all three major components of a 
"wrongdoing" determination, requiring: (1) a hearing, (2) strict rules 
of evidence, and (3) clear and convincing evidence of wrongdoing. 9 
The Maryland approach best ensures Crawford confrontation when 
determining whether the defendant has forfeited or waived 
I. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
4. 541 u.s. 36 (2004). 
5. Id. at 53. 
6. See irifra Parts II-VII. 
7. See, e.g., U.S. v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269,272-73; Paul W. Grimm & Jerome E. 
Diese, Jr., Hearsay, Corifrontation, and Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: Crawford v. 
Washington, a Reassessment of the Corifrontation Clause, 35 U. BALT. L.F. 5 passim 
(2004). 
8. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-901(b) (LexisNexis 2006). 
9. See id.; see also Tracey L. Perrick, Crawford v. Washington: Redefining Sixth 
Amendment Jurisprudence; The Impact Across the United States and in Maryland, 35 
U. BALT. L. REv. 133, 162-65 (2005); cf Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W.3d 603, 611 
(Tex. App. 2004) (holding that the rule of forfeiture applies "whether or not the 
defendant specifically intended to prevent the witness from testifying at the time he 
committed the act that rendered the witness unavailable"). 
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confrontation by wrongdoing. The Supreme Court has yet to rule. 
Because the Court is unlikely to go as far as Maryland has gone, this 
article proposes a compromise to balance the defendant's ri9ht to 
confrontation with the prosecution's right to prove wrongdoing. 0 
I. THE PROBLEM THAT BEGS FOR A NATIONAL, 
UNIFORM, CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION 
After Ohio v. Roberts II in 1980, many defendants were convicted 
on out-of-court hearsay statements that were not subject to cross-
examination, and denied the opportunity to confront the statement's 
maker. 12 As a result of Roberts, the Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation essentially gave way to the exceptions to the rule 
against hearsay in a given jurisdiction. 13 
Under Roberts, hearsay statements were admissible, even when not 
subject to cross-examination, so long as the hearsay statement was 
reliable. 14 A hearsay statement was deemed reliable, and thus 
admissible, if the statement came within one of the firmly rooted 
exceptions to the rule against hearsay.15 If the hearsay statement 
came within an exception to the rule against hearsay, but not a firmly 
rooted exception, the statement was not automatically reliable. 16 
However, it was reliable if there were indicia of reliability in the wa~ 
in which the statement was made, as determined by the trial court. I 
Suffice to say, if a hearsay statement was admissible under the rules 
of evidence, it almost always satisfied the Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation. 18 
A quarter centuQ' later, Crawford v. Washington l9 expressly 
overruled Roberts. 2 The Crawford Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation guarantees a defendant the right to 
cross-examine a witness if, without the witness present, the statement 
would be testimonial hearsay.21 Although the Court did not decide 
10. See infra Part VIII. 
11. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
12. Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation Clause, 54 S.c. L. REV. 537, 581-84 
(2003). 
13. See id. at 619. 
14. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. See id. 
18. White, supra note 12, at 619. 
19. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
20. See id. at 67-69. 
21. See id. at 68-69. 
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the full scope of what hearsay is testimonial,22 it appeared that a 
statement was testimonial if made to a government official in 
anticiration of, or for the purpose of, criminal investigation and 
trial. 2 Thus, even under a "narrow standard," most statements made 
to law enforcement officers would be testimonial. 24 
Under Crawford, testimonial hearsay of unavailable witnesses is 
only admissible if the hearsay statement was subject to cross-
examination when made. 25 Because virtually no testimonial hearsay 
given to law enforcement officers is subject to cross-examination, if 
the witness is unavailable, the testimonial hearsay is inadmissible. 26 
The Crawford Court, by dicta, recognized the then 126-year-old 
doctrine called "forfeiture by wrongdoing. ,,27 This doctrine stands 
for the proposition that a defendant should not profit from his or her 
wrongdoing. 28 Thus, a defendant should not be allowed to procure 
the unavailability of a witness-through intimidation, murder, or 
anywhere in between-and then successfully preclude the testimonial 
hearsay of that witness because the witness is unavailable and not 
present to testify. 
When Roberts controlled, testimonial hearsay was much more 
readily admissible, and prosecutors rarely had to rely on the doctrine 
of forfeiture by wrongdoing. 29 However, with the Confrontation 
Clause so dramatically changed after Crawford in favor of 
defendants, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine has been 
revitalized. Indeed, whenever a witness is unavailable, if there 
appears to be any causal connection between that unavailability and 
the defendant's conduct, the prosecutor may seek to admit the 
testimonial hearsay by arguing that the defendant forfeited his or her 
right to confrontation under Crawford. 30 
The Supreme Court had not-and still has not-held whether there 
are minimal constitutional standards for determining the applicability 
of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. In a given case, the most 
dispositive ruling along the way to resolving guilt or innocence is 
likely to be the ruling on the admissibility of testimonial hearsay, 
22. !d. at 68. 
23. See id. at 52. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 68-69. 
26. See id. 
27. Jd. at 62. 
28. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266,2280 (2006). 
29. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. 
30. See, e.g., Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280; U.S. v. Rivera, 412 F.3d 562, 566-67 (4th Cir. 
2005); U.S. v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227,240-42 (4th Cir. 2005). 
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particularly testimonial hearsay of the victim, when the defendant 
claims a violation of the right to confrontation, and the prosecution 
claims that the defendant forfeited the Crawford right to 
confrontation by his or her wrongdoing. 
Thus, the question becomes what, if any, constitutional 
requirements exist for the manner in which the determination of 
constitutional wrongdoing/waiver is made? Must there be a hearing, 
or is a proffer from the prosecutor sufficient? 
If there is a hearing, does it apply the informal rules of evidence 
typically used during pre-trial motion hearings, or must strict rules of 
evidence be used? On first blush, because this is a pre-trial hearing 
out of the presence of the jury, it may seem logical to use informal 
rules of evidence. If so, hearsay would be admissible. 31 That is the 
problem. Can a hearing to determine whether the right to 
confrontation can tolerate hearsay be resolved using nothing more 
than that very hearsay? 
Regardless of the nature of the hearing to resolve the prosecution's 
claim of forfeiture by wrongdoing, how certain must the court be that 
the defendant committed wrongdoing? Because a finding of 
wrongdoing may well be dispositive of the ultimate issue of guilt or 
innocence, what risk of error in that fact-finding can due process 
tolerate? Can it tolerate only a risk of error of about 30% under clear 
and convincing evidence, or can it tolerate the higher 49% risk of 
error assigned to preponderance of the evidence? 
II. INTRODUCTION 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees that 
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to 
be confronted with the [w]itnesses against him.,,32 This right ensures 
that the defendant may cross-examine witnesses against him to: (1) 
evoke favorable testimony and (2) refute unfavorable testimony 
through impeachment. 33 This "bedrock procedural guarantee,,34 was 
mad~ applicable to the states in 1965 through the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 35 
In the landmark decision of Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme 
Court expanded the scope of Confrontation Clause protections by 
holding that out-of-court testimonial hearsay statements may not be 
31. See Knight v. State, 7 Md. 313, 321, 255 A.2d 441, 446 (1969). 
32. U.S. CON ST. amend. VI. 
33. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974). 
34. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42. 
35. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 401 (1965). 
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introduced against a defendant unless (1) the declarant of the out-of-
court testimonial hearsay statement is unavailable, and (2) the 
defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at the 
time the out-of-court statement was made. 36 
Crawford is considered to be noteworthy for a number of reasons. 
First, Crawford overruled Roberts,37 which permitted prosecutorial 
use of out-of-court statements if they possessed "adequate indicia of 
reliability.,,38 Crawford, rejecting the "adequate indicia of 
reliability" test, held that the "reliability exception" was 
unpredictable and subjective. 39 According to Crawford, the 
"unpardonable vice" of Roberts was its admission of "core 
testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to 
exclude.,,4o 
Second, Crawford explained that an open-ended balancing test 
violates the Confrontation Clause because it allowed a jury to hear 
evidence that had been untested by the adversarial ~rocess, based 
solely on a judge's determination of its reliability. I Under the 
Confrontation Clause, reliability must be achieved by testing the 
evidence in the "crucible of cross-examination.,,42 
Third, Crawford now vigorously protects a defendant's right to 
confrontation by greatly increasing the situations that require live 
testimony. 43 Crawford was decided by a Court that was conservative 
on criminal justice issues, and the prosecution prevailed in most 
cases.
44 When the defense prevailed, it was almost never by a 
unanimous opinion, particularly one in which seven justices 
expressly overruled a strong pro-prosecution precedent. 45 
Fourth, Crawford, as well as other cases,46 demonstrates both 
Justice Scalia's position on the Confrontation Clause and his 
36. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
37. Id. at 37. 
38. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,66 (1980). 
39. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62-63. 
40. Id. at 63. 
41. Id.at61. 
42. ld. 
43. See id. at 43-44 (examining the common law roots of the "live testimony" 
requirement. 
44. See id. at 57-66 (discussing previously decided cases). 
45. In Crawford, all nine justices ruled in favor of the defendant. Id. at 37. However, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice O'Connor, 
rejecting the majority's decision to overrule Roberts, but agreeing with the result. /d. 
at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
46. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860-70 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
U.S. v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988). 
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influence on the Court. Indeed, Crawford arose from Justice Scalia's 
scathing dissent in Maryland v. Craig. 47 In a 5-to-4 decision, the 
Craig Court upheld a Maryland statute in the face of a Confrontation 
Clause challenge. 48 The statute denied the defendant, in a child 
sexual abuse case, face-to-face confrontation as the witness was 
permitted to testify from another room. 49 Justice Scalia, dissenting, 
espoused the virtues of vigorous cross-examination as the preeminent 
tool in administering justice fairly. 50 Fourteen years later, in 
Crawford, Justice Scalia persuaded the Court that the Confrontation 
Clause should not merely be a "rubberstamp" of federal and state 
rules of evidence. 51 
Post-Crawford, the question has become how courts balance a 
defendant's confrontation rights against allegations of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing, and the extent to which the scope of Crawford itself 
dictates procedures for forfeiture/waiver determinations. Maryland is 
the only jurisdiction that takes a defense-oriented, pro-confrontation 
position on all three major components of a wrongdoing 
determination, requiring: (1) a hearing, (2) strict rules of evidence, 
and (3) clear and convincing evidence of wrongdoing. 52 
The Maryland approach best ensures Crawford confrontation when 
determining whether the defendant has forfeited or waived 
confrontation by wrongdoing. However, because the Court is 
unlikely to go as far as Maryland has gone, this article proposes a 
compromise to balance the defense ri~ht to confrontation with the 
prosecution right to prove wrongdoing. 
III. TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY 
The holding in Crawford prohibits the admission of out-of-court 
statements in the absence of the declarant's live testimony, if the 
47. Compare Craig, 497 U.S. at 860-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting) with Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 66. 
48. Craig, 497 U.S. at 856. 
49. See id. at 836. 
50. Id. at 860-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
51. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-62. 
52. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-901 (LexisNexis 2006); see also Stephen 
Shapiro & Steve Grossman, Maryland's New 'Witness Intimidation' Hearsay 
Exception: Is It a Toothless Tiger?, THE DAILY RECORD, May 13, 2005, at 2B 
(commenting from a prosecution-oriented perspective on the Maryland legislation 
that, inter alia, requires: proof by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's 
wrongdoing caused the absence of testimony, a hearing before a judge, and strict 
application of the Maryland Rules of Evidence). 
53. See infra Part VIII. 
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statement constitutes testimonial hearsay. 54 Although the Court was 
unwilling to explore the outer limit of what is testimonial, the Court 
noted that "testimonial," in the hearsay context, must be understood 
in its colloquial sense and not in a legal sense. 55 Testimonial hearsay 
includes depositions, affidavits, grand j~ testimony, preliminary 
hearing testimony, and prior trial testimony. 6 
The real significance of Crawford is that testimonial hearsay 
includes statements made to government officials under 
circumstances that would cause an objective person to reasonab~ 
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. 
This includes, as in Crawfords a police interrogation or interview 
during a criminal investigation. 8 
Although Crawford did not have the issue before it, the Court 
indicated that its holding would not apply to out-of-court non-
testimonial hearsay statements, such as business records and 
statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy. 59 Moreover, 
Crawford does not apply to dying declarations, whether they are 
testimonial or non-testimonial. 60 
In 2006, in Davis v. Washington ,61 in two consolidated cases, the 
Supreme Court provided some clarity as to what hearsay is 
testimonial hearsay post-Crawford. 62 In Davis, the Court held that a 
statement is not testimonial, and thus not subject to Crawford, when 
made during police interrogation under circumstances objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable 
police to meet an ongoing emergency.63 However, a statement is 
testimonial, and thus subject to Crawford, when the primary purpose 
is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to criminal 
. 64 prosecutlon. 
In Davis, a female victim called 911 and told the operator she had 
just been assaulted by the defendant, her former boyfriend. 65 When 
the police arrived shortly thereafter, the victim was still visibly 
54. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54. 
55. Id. at 53. 
56. See id. at 51-52. 
57. Id. at 52. 
58. Compare id. with Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006). 
59. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. 
60. Id. at 56 n.6. 
61. 126 S. Ct. 2266. 
62. See Timothy O'Toole & Catharine Easterly, Davis v. Washington: Confrontation 
Wins the Day, THE CHAMPION, Mar. 2007, at 20-21. 
63. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74. 
64. Jd. 
65. Id. at 2271. 
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shaken and had fresh bruises and injuries on her body.66 She was 
frantically trying to collect her belongings and gather her children out 
of fear for their safety. 67 The victim's statements were not made at a 
police station, as in Crawford, but rather were made during a 911 call 
for emergency assistance. 68 
The victim was speaking of events that were happening in an 
ongoing emergency, and her statement was elicited to help the police 
address a present emergency rather than investigate events in the 
past. 69 The panic in the victim's voice and the nature of her 
responses to the 911 operator showed that the primary purpose of her 
statements was to enable police to assist her in the ongoing 
emergency.70 Therefore, the Court held that her 911 statements were 
not testimonial within the meaning of Crawford. 71 
In Davis, regarding the second of the consolidated cases, Hammon 
v. Indiana, the Court held that the challenged out-of-court hearsay 
statement was testimonial and thus subject to Crawford. 72 Officers 
went to the defendant's home in response to a report of a domestic 
disturbance. 73 The wife was waiting on the porch, appeared 
frightened, told the officers nothing was wrong, and let the officers 
into the residence. 74 One officer kept the defendant in one part of the 
residence while another officer interviewed the wife. 75 
Eventually, the wife signed an affidavit, indicating that she had 
been battered by her husband. 76 At trial, the wife, although 
subpoenaed, did not appear to testify.77 The Supreme Court held 
that, unlike in Davis, the victim's statements here were made at a 
time when she was not apparently in immediate danger. 78 Instead, 
she was conveying information about the past rather than seeking 
66. Id. 
67. See id. 
68. -Compare Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38--40 (2004) with Davis, 126 S. Ct. 
at 2271-72. 
69. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276-77. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. See id. at 2278. 
73. Id. at 2272 (citing Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444,446 (2005)). 
74. !d. (citing Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 446--47; Joint Appendix at 16, Davis, 126 S.Ct. 
2266 (No. 05-5705), 2005 WL 3617526). 
75. Id. (citing Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 447; Joint Appendix, supra note 74, at 17,32). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
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immediate aid. 79 Thus, these statements were testimonial under 
Crawford. 80 
Post-Crawford, Maryland has limited the scope of testimonial 
hearsay. In State v. Snowden,81 the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
had its first occasion to apply Crawford. The issue addressed was 
whether section 11-304 of the Maryland Criminal Procedure Article 
(known as the "tender years" statute), which permitted out-of-court 
hearsay statements of child declarants through the testimony of a 
social worker to whom the statements were made, violated the right 
to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment and Article 21 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights. 82 
This statute allowed health professionals or social workers to 
testify on behalf of children they interviewed if the trial court 
interviewed the child in a closed proceeding and determined that the 
child's statement contained, "specific guarantees of 
trustworthiness." 83 Under the statute, this method of allowing 
substitute testimony for the child victim aPElied whether the child 
victim was available or unavailable to testify. 4 
In Snowden, a licensed social worker employed by a county child 
protective services agency conducted interviews with each of three 
alleged child sexual abuse victims (ages eight to ten).85 Pursuant to 
the tender years statute, the social worker in Snowden testified to 
what the children told her, but none of the children testified. 86 The 
defendant was convicted of child abuse and third-degree sexual 
offense. 87 
While the Snowden case was on appeal, Crawford was decided by 
the Supreme Court. 88 Applying Crawford, a unanimous Court of 
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland and held that the statements of the child victims were 
testimonial. 89 An individual, assuming the perspectives of the 
children, could anticipate that statements they made to a sexual abuse 
investigator could be used to prosecute the defendant. 90 In fact, in 
79. Id. at 2279. 
80. Id. 
8!. 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314 (2005). 
82. Id. at 68, 867 A.2d at 316. 
83. Id. at 73, 867 A.2d at 319. 
84. Id. at 78, 867 A.2d at 322. 
85. Id. at 68-70, 867 A.2d at 316-17. 
86. Id. at 73, 867 A.2d at 319. 
87. Id. at 73-74, 867 A.2d at 319. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 74,867 A.2d at 319. 
90. Id. at 84, 867 A.2d at 325. 
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this case the children were actually aware that this was the purpose of 
the interviews. 91 The social worker's interviews with the children 
were conducted as part of the police investigation. 92 
The State argued that the court should find the statements of the 
children to be non-testimonial per se. 93 The court stated that it was 
"unwilling to conclude that, as a matter of law, young children's 
statements cannot possess the same testimonial nature as those of 
other, more clearly competent declarants.,,94 The court continued: 
This concern for the testimonial capacity of young children 
overlooks the fundamental principles underlying the 
Confrontation Clause. Even though there are sound public 
policy reasons for limiting a child victim's exposure to a 
potentially traumatizing courtroom experience, we 
nonetheless must be faithful to the Constitution's deep 
concern for.the fundamental rights of the accused. Although 
the Supreme Court has recognized that the interest of 
protecting victims may triumph over some rights protected 
by the Confrontation Clause, it also has concluded that such 
interests may never outweigh the explicit guarantees of the 
Clause, including the "right to meet fCfce to face all those 
who appear and give evidence at triai.,,95 
Ultimately, the court did not invalidate Maryland's tender years 
statute, but restricted its use to situations in which a child's 
statements to a health or social worker were non-testimonial. 96 
In Griner v. State,97 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
addressed testimonial hearsay. In Griner, a child victim made 
statements about physical abuse to a nurse during medical treatment 
at a hospital. 98 Before the nurse and others testified at trial, and with 
the jury not present, the prosecution proffered the child's statements, 
arguing that they were admissible as an exception to the rule against 
hearsay for statements made during medical treatment or diagnosis. 99 
91. /d. at 84-85, 867 A.2d at 326. 
92. Id. at 84, 867 A.2d at 325. 
93. /d. at 89, 867 A.2d at 328. 
94. ld. at 89, 867 A.2d at 328-29. 
95. /d. at 90, 867 A.2d at 329 (citations omitted). 
96. ld. at 92, 867 A.2d at 330. 
97. 168 Md. App. 714, 899 A.2d 189 (2006). 
98. ld. at 726-27,899 A.2d at 196. 
99. ld. at 736, 899 A.2d at 202. 
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The defendant argued the statements violated her rights under 
Crawford because they were testimonial. 100 The trial court admitted 
the statements, ruling, in part, that they were not testimonial. 101 The 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that, because the 
statements were not admitted under the tender years statute,102 and 
because the defendant's only appellate argument was based on the 
tender years statute, admission of the statements was not 
preserved. 103 However, the court explained that the defendant would 
not have prevailed in any event, because the trial court properly 
concluded that the child's statements to the nurse were made in 
conjunction with medical diagnosis and treatment and not for the 
purpose of gathering testimony for trial. 104 
Moreover, under Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(4), statements taken and 
given for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment are not excluded 
by the rule against hearsay.105 This contem~lates statements that 
describe how the patient incurred the injury. I 6 In this case, there 
was enough evidence to show the child understood such information 
had to be given to the nurse for medical reasons. 107 
In another child abuse case, Lawson v. State,108 a seven-year old 
girl accused the defendant of sexually molesting her. 109 A social 
worker employed b~ the county Department of Social Services 
interviewed the girl. 10 The girl, the girl's mother, and the social 
worker all testified at trial. III The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
distinguished Snowden and held that the challenged testimony of the 
social worker at trial was admissible under Maryland's tender years 
statute. 112 When a declarant testifies at trial, there is no violation of 
the Confrontation Clause. 113 Here, the social worker did not testify 
in place of the child. 114 
100. Id. at 737,899 A.2d at 202. 
101. Id. 
102. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-304 (LexisNexis 2006). 
103. Griner, 168 Md. App. at 736-40,899 A.2d at 201-04. 
104. Id. at 742-43, 899 A.2d at 205-06. 
105. Id. at 744-45, 899 A.2d at 207-08. 
106. ld. 
107. Jd. at 746-47, 899 A.2d at 207-08. 
108. 389 Md. 570, 886 A.2d 876 (2005). 
109. Id. at 577, 886 A.2d at 880. 
110. ld. 
111. Id. at 577-79,886 A.2d at 879-81. 
112. Id. at 586-89,886 A.2d at 885-87. 
113. Id. at 588-89, 886 A.2d at 886-87 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 
n.9 (2004)). 
114. ld. at 589, 886 A.2d at 887. 
2008) Forfeiture By Wrongdoing 215 
In a different testimonial hearsay argument, in Rollins v. State, I 15 
the Court of ApReals of Maryland addressed the admissibility of 
autopsy reports. 6 On appeal from a murder conviction, the 
defendant argued that his confrontation rights were violated when the 
trial court denied his pretrial motion to exclude the testimony of a 
medical examiner, arguing that the medical examiner's "opinion was 
based on hearsay statements contained in the autopsy report from 
witnesses who mayor may not testify at trial," and that Crawford 
1· d 117 app Ie to autopsy reports. 
In a case of first impression, the court held that autopsy reports are 
not per se testimonial,118 but (1) autopsy reports that fall under the 
business or public records exception are still subject to Crawford 
scrutiny; 119 (2) factual, routine, descriptive, and non-analytical 
findings in autopsy reports are non-testimonial and may be admitted 
without the testimony/availability of the medical examiner; and (3) 
conclusions drawn from objective findings are testimonial and must 
be redacted if the medical examiner is unavailable. 120 
In this case, the trial court redacted all testimonial statements from 
the autopsy report prepared by the medical examiner prior to 
admission into evidence, including the conclusion that the victim's 
death was a homicide caused by smothering. 121 The remaining non-
testimonial hearsay statements were admissible under the business or 
public records exception to the rule against hearsay. 122 
In Costley v. State,123 the defendant argued that the trial court 
violated Crawford by admitting an autopsy report and a physician's 
testimony about the contents of the report. 124 The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland held there was no error in admitting the 
report. 125 At the defendant's trial, the doctor testified only as to the 
physical findings in the autopsy report, and the defendant was able to 
cross-examine the doctor. 126 
115. 392 Md. 455,897 A.2d 821 (2006). 
116. Id. at 459,897 A.2d at 823. 
117. Id. at 459-60, 897 A.2d at 823. 
118. Id. at 486,897 A.2d at 839. 
119. /d. at 497,897 A.2d at 845. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 489-90, 897 A.2d at 841. 
122. Id. at 496--97,897 A.2d at 845. 
123. 175 Md. App. 90, 926 A.2d 769 (2007). 
124. Id. at 115,926 A.2d at 783. 
125. /d. at 126, 926 A.2d at 790. 
126. Id. 
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Following the Supreme Court decision in Davis the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland decided Head v. State. 1h In that case, 
officers responded immediately to the scene of the crime and 
followed a trail of blood to the kitchen where they found the victim 
begging for help. 128 The smell of gunpowder was strong in the air 
when officers asked the victim, "Who shot you?" 129 The victim 
answered, "Bobby," referring to the defendant. 130 On appeal, the 
defendant argued that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment 
confrontation rights in allowing the officer to testify to the victim's 
declaration that "Bobby" killed him under the "dying declaration" 
and "excited utterance" exceptions to the rule against hearsay. 131 The 
court ~plied Davis, decided six weeks after oral argument in this 
case,13 and held that the statement "Bobby" was non-testimonial. 133 
The circumstances objectively indicated that the primary purpose of 
the officer's question was not to establish or prove past events. 134 
Rather, the officers needed to know, for safety reasons, whether the 
person who shot the victim was still in the house. 135 Therefore, it 
was not a violation of the defendant's right to confrontation to allow 
the officer to testify as to the victim's identification of the 
defendant. 136 
In another "911 case," Marquardt v. State,137 the defendant, who 
was looking for his girlfriend, broke into the wronW house, and then 
broke into a house that belonged to her friend. 13 The defendant 
assaulted the friend with a baseball bat because he believed the friend 
was holding something in his hand, and he draB~ed the girlfriend 
from the house into his car and assaulted her. The defendant 
argued that the court erroneously admitted three pieces of evidence, 
including the 911 call from the victim. 140 The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland held that, under Crawford, the 911 call was 
127. 171 Md. App. 642, 912 A.2d 1 (2006). 
128. Id. at 646-47, 912 A.2d at 3-4. 
129. Id. at 644, 912 A.2d at 2. 
130. Id. 
131. Jd. at 647-48, 912 A.2d at 4. 
132. Id. at 645,912 A.2d at 2. 
133. Id. at 660, 912 A.2d at 12. 
134. !d. at 659-60, 912 A.2d at 11-12. 
135. Id. at 660,912 A.2d at 11. 
136. Id. at 660-61, 912 A.2d at 12. 
137. 164 Md. App. 95, 882 A.2d 900 (2005). 
138. Id. at 110-12,882 A.2d at 909-10. 
139. Id. at 112,882 A.2d at 910. 
140. Id. at 119, 882 A.2d at 914. 
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non-testimonial 141 because the victim called 911 for help while she 
was bein¥ assaulted; therefore, the tape of the call could later be used 
at trial. 14 
In summary, testimonial hearsay is subject to the restrictions of 
Crawford, making the admissibility of such statements unlikely. 
Non-testimonial hearsay is not controlled by Crawford; instead, it is 
controlled by Roberts and much more likely to be admissible. 
IV. WITNESS UNAVAILABILITY 
A prerequisite to the admission of an out-of-court testimonial 
statement, in lieu of live testimony, is that the declarant be 
unavailable. 143 A declarant is not unavailable if that unavailability 
resulted from prosecutorial negligence or a lack of good faith in 
attempting to obtain the declarant's presence for trial. 144 
A declarant is unavailable as a witness if the witness is: (1) 
deceased,145 (2) emigrated to another country,146 (3) unable to be 
located despite a good faith effort,147 (4) has no memory,148 or (5) 
incompetent. 149 Moreover, if live testimony by a child witness will 
cause serious emotional distress, making the child unable to 
communicate reasonably, the declarant is unavailable. 150 
Furthermore, if a declarant has a privilege, such as the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination or a 
marital privilege, the declarant is unavailable. 151 In Maryland, if a 
person has a serious physical disability that prevents the person from 
testifying, the declarant is unavailable. 152 
Prosecutors argue that Crawford makes prosecution of child abuse 
and domestic violence cases much more difficult because, in those 
141. ld. at 122,882 A.2d at 916. 
142. ld. 
143. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
144. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 
474 (1900). 
145. MD. R. 5-804(a)(4); e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). 
146. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1972). 
147. MD. R. 5-804(a)(5); e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
148. MD. R. 5-804(a)(3); e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 168 n.17 (1970). 
149. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816 (1990). 
150. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990). 
151. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1); MD. R. 5-804(a)(I). 
152. See MD. R. 5-804(a)(4). 
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cases, the victim witness is more likely to become unavailable than in 
h f . 153 ot er types 0 prosecutIOns. 
In child abuse cases, the victim may be "unavailable" to testify for 
a number of reasons, including "a child's age and maturity level, his 
or her general fear of a courtroom environment, or simply a parent or 
guardian specifically urging the child not to testi~ at trial for fear 
that the child will become emotionally upset." 54 In domestic 
violence cases, prosecutors argue that Crawford "creates perverse 
incentives for domestic violence batterer-defendants to absent their 
victims from court and then seek dismissal of their charges by raising 
the Confrontation Clause." 155 
In both child abuse cases and domestic violence cases, prosecutors 
have a greater need to use out-of-court statements, but after 
Crawford, there are stringent requirements for admission that often 
cannot be met. 156 
V. WITNESS INTIMIDATION & FORFEITURE BY 
WRONGDOING 
Despite the concern that Crawford has limited "the prosecution's 
arsenal for combating witness intimidation,,,157 Supreme Court cases 
pre-Crawford and post-Crawford approved the prosecution's ability 
to seek a determination that the defendant, by wrongdoing, 
"forfeited" his or her confrontation rights under Crawford. 158 
Through the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, the prosecution 
may admit out-of-court statements, despite the unavailability of the 
witness, if the defendant's wrongful conduct procured the witness's 
unavailability through intimidation, coercion, and/or violence. 159 
This doctrine provides a way for courts to ensure a defendant's 
protection under the Confrontation Clause, while enjoining him from 
153. See Matthew M. Staab, Student Work, Child's Play: Avoiding the Pitfalls of 
Crawford v. Washington in Child Abuse Prosecution, 108 W. VA. L. REv. 501, 502-
03 (2005). 
154. Id. at 535. 
155. Andrew King-Ries, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: A Panacea for Victimless Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 39 CREIGHTON L. REv. 441, 472 (2006). 
156. See, e.g., Perrick, supra note 9, at 144, 148-49. 
157. Andrew King-Ries, An Argumentfor Original Intent: Restoring Rule 80J(d)(J)(A) to 
Protect Domestic Violence Victims in a Post-Crawford World, 27 PACE L. REV. 199, 
240 (2007). 
158. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). 
159. See King-Ries, supra note 157, at 229. 
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complaining about being denied his right of confrontation when the 
defendant himself caused that unavailability. 160 
Although the forfeiture doctrine existed at common law and was 
codified by federal rule in 1997, this doctrine has evolved into a 
critical part of the analysis of the defendant's Sixth Amendment 
rights as delineated by Crawford. 161 
A. Pre-Crawford 
Under the common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, if the 
defendant's misconduct was the cause of a witness being unavailable, 
the defendant could not object to the admission of that witness's 
statement on the grounds of denial of the right to cross-examine the 
witness. 162 In Reynolds v. United States,163 the Supreme Court held 
that the Constitution does not provide a defendant with the means to 
perform an end-run around this common law doctrine: 
The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at 
which he should be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; but if a witness is absent by his own wrongful 
procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is 
admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept away. 
The Constitution does not guarantee an accused person 
against the legitimate consequences of his own wrongful 
acts. It grants him the privilege of being confronted with 
the witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the 
160. See Grimm & Deise, supra note 7, at 32-33. 
161. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280 ("The Roberts approach to the Confrontation Clause 
undoubtedly made recourse to this doctrine less necessary, because prosecutors could 
show the "reliability" of ex parte statements more easily than they could show the 
defendant's procurement of the witness's absence. Crawford, in overruling Roberts, 
did not destroy the ability of courts to protect the integrity of their proceedings."); see 
also Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford's Impact 
on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 361 (2005) 
("Crawford virtually invited prosecutors to raise claims of forfeiture when facing 
Confrontation Clause challenges," and consequently, it "is likely that forfeiture will 
be a factor in a number of domestic violence cases."); Deborah Tuerkheimer, 
Crawford's Triangle: Domestic Violence and the Right of Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. 
REV. I, 34 (2006) (arguing that Crawford "instantly creates the prospect of a newly 
robust forfeiture doctrine as well as provid[es] an impetus for its re-envisioning.") 
(footnote omitted). 
162. See Kelly Rutan, Comment, Procuring the Right to an Unfair Trial: Federal Rule of 
Evidence 804(8)(6) and the Due Process Implications of the Rule's Failure to 
Require Standards of Reliability for Admissible Evidence, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 177, 
183-84 (2006). 
163. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
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witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege. If, 
therefore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is 
supplied in some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert 
that his constitutional rights have been violated. 164 
In the 126 years from Reynolds to Crawford, Reynolds has been cited 
only five times by the Supreme Court, and with no elaboration of the 
constitutional dimensions of the doctrine of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing. 165 
In the 1970s, federal courts began to apply the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing principle to admit hearsay testimony of witnesses who 
were intimidated or prevented from testifying in narcotics and 
organized crime cases, using the "residual exception" to the rule 
against hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 807. 166 
In the first such case, United States v. Carlson,167 the Eighth 
Circuit held that the defendant, who intimidated a witness into 
refusing to testify against him, pursued a course of conduct that was 
"itself inimical to the administration of justice." 168 Concluding that 
to "permit the defendant to profit from such conduct would be 
contrary to public policy, common sense and the underlying purpose 
of the [C]onfrontation [C]lause," Carlson held that the defendant 
waived his rights under the Confrontation Clause. 169 
Carlson and other cases permitted the introduction of hearsay 
statements of witnesses whose unavailability was procured by the 
defendant. The courts usually admitted such statements on the theory 
164. Id. at 158-59. 
165. See James F. Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the Misnamed Exception for 
"Forfeiture" by Wrongdoing, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1193, 1208-09 (2006); 
see also Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458,473-74 (1900) ("In the present case 
there was not the slightest ground in the evidence to suppose that Taylor had 
absented himself from the trial at the instance, by the procurement, or with the assent 
of either of the accused."); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 n.2 (1992); Diaz v. 
United States, 223 U.S. 442, 452 (1912); West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 265 
(1904); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895). Frankly, pre-Crawford: 
Reynolds was not an important precedent. The novel issue was 
not that the defendant dcliberately kept his wife from appearing 
and thereby waived the right to confront her. The opinion made 
clear that this principle was already firmly established [in the 
common law]. Rather, the important point was that prior trial 
testimony, subject to cross-examination, could be admitted. 
Flanagan, supra, at 1208 (footnote omitted). 
166. See Flanagan, supra note 165, at 1209. 
167. 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976). 
168. [d. at 1357-59. 
169. [d. at 1359. 
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that the statements 
trustworthiness under 
hearsay. 170 
possessed the requisite guarantees of 
the residual exception to the rule against 
This changed in 1979 when the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. 
Balano,17I held that because the defendant procured the 
unavailability of the witness, the defendant also waived his 
confrontation rights. l72 Unlike Carlson, Balano found that there was 
no reason to consider whether the testimony was admissible under the 
rule against hearsay, concluding that "[a] valid waiver of the 
constitutional right is a valid waiver of an objection under the rules of 
evidence." 173 The application of the waiver by misconduct doctrine, 
under both constitutional and non-constitutional analyses became a 
common approach in the federal circuits. 174 
In 1982, the Second Circuit decided United States v. 
Mastrangelo, 175 which provided important precedent for later 
application of the forfeiture doctrine at the federal level, as well as 
the subsequent federal rule regarding forfeiture by wrongdoing. 176 In 
Mastrangelo, the defendant, who was charged with violating 
narcotics laws, was recorded via wiretap threatening the State's only 
eyewitness.177 Subsequently, the witness was murdered while 
traveling to testify.178 The trial court declared a mistrial, ruling by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was involved in the 
170. See Flanagan, supra note 165, at 1210 & n.95 (citing United States v. Rouco, 765 
F.2d 983, 993-96 (11th Cir. 1985); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1199-1200 (6th 
Cir. 1982); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1134-36, 1138 (4th Cir. 1978); 
Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1354-55; United States v. Mastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. 389, 391 
(E.D.N.Y. 1982); cf United States v. Thevis, 84 F.R.D. 57, 63-66 (N.D. Ga. 1979), 
aff'd. on other grounds, 665 F.2d 616, 628-30 (5th Cir. 1982), superseded on limited 
grounds by rule, FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6), as recognized in United States v. Ziatogur, 
271 F.3d 1025,1028 (11th Cir. 2001). 
17l. 618 F .2d 624 (10th Cir. 1979). 
172. See id. at 626. 
173. ld. 
174. See Flanagan, supra note 165, at 12\0 & n.98 (citing United States v. Emery, 186 
F.3d 921, 926-27 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911-12 
(D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d. 1271, 1279-80 (1st Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1982». 
175. 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982). 
176. See Grimm & Deise, supra note 7, at 25-29; Rutan, supra note 162, at 182, 186-87 
(stating that the author of Mastrangelo later became the chair of the Federal Rules 
Advisory Committee, and was chair of the Committee in 1997 when Federal Rule of 
Evidence. 804(b)(6) codified the forfeiture doctrine). 
177. See Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 271. 
178. ld. 
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conduct that led to the murder of the witness. 179 Upon retrial, the 
prosecution entered the grand jury testimony of the murdered witness 
into the record, which later formed the basis of the defendant's 
appeal. 180 
On appeal, the Second Circuit remanded the case for an evidentiary 
hearing on whether the defendant procured the witness's 
unavailability, opining: 
[I]f a witness' [sic] silence is procured by the defendant 
himself, whether by chicanery, by threats, or by actual 
violence or murder, the defendant cannot then assert his 
[C]onfrontation [C]lause rights in order to prevent prior 
grand jury testimony of that witness from being admitted 
against him. Any other result would mock the very system 
of justice the [C]onfrontation [C]lause was designed to 
protect. 181 
During this time, state courts also began applying the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing principle by focusing on the defendant's role in securing 
the unavailability of a witness. States generally addressed the waiver 
of any objection to the use of such a witness's out-of-court statement 
on confrontation or evidentiary grounds. 182 
For example, in State v. Gettings, the State's key witness was found 
murdered several months after he made a taped statement that 
implicated the defendant in an arson. 183 Relying heavily on the 
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing in the federal courts, the Kansas 
Supreme Court affirmed the introduction of the taped statement into 
evidence because the defendant had, through murder of the witness, 
waived both his constitutional right to confrontation and any hearsay 
b·· h 184 o ~ectlOns to t e statement. 
In 1992, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence 
began considering codification of the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
doctrine. 185 In 1997, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) was 
179. See id. 
180. See id. at 272. 
181. Id. at 272-73 (citations omitted). 
182. See Flanagan, supra note 165, at 1210 & n.99 (citing Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 
1199-1200 (6th Cir. 1982); Devonshire v. United States, 691 A.2d 165, 166 (D.C. 
1997); State v. Gettings, 769 P.2d 25 (Kan. 1989); State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); Holtzman v. Hellenbrand, 460 N.Y.S.2d 591, 597 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983)) (citations omitted). 
183. See 769 P.2d at 28-29. 
184. See id. 
185. See Flanagan, supra note 165, at 1212. 
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promulgated. 186 Under this rule, a hearsay statement is not excluded 
from evidence because the declarant is unavailable if the statement is 
"offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in 
wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability 
of the declarant as a witness.,,187 
Unlike some other exceptions to the rule against hearsay, which are 
predicated on the notion of reliability of statements, FED. R. EVID. 
804(b)( 6) represents "a prophylactic rule [designed] to deal with 
abhorrent behavior 'which strikes at the heart of the system of justice 
itself.,,,188 In other words, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) is 
intended to make clear to defendants that there is "nothing to be 
gained from compounding his crimes by killing or threatening the 
witness{ since the witness' [sic] statements will be admitted in any 
event." 89 
Several states and U.S. territories have enacted equivalents of 
Federal Rule of Evidence.804~b)(6), 190 including Delaware, 191 
Guam,l92 Hawaii,193 Kentucky,1 4 Michigan,195 North Dakota, 196 
Ohio,197 Pennsylvania, 198 Tennessee,199 and Vermont. 200 New 
Mexico judicially applied the federal approach codified in Federal 
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), even though it had not been formally 
adopted by New Mexico's legislature. 201 
Other states have enacted statutes that do not mirror the federal 
rules but nonetheless codify forfeiture by wrongdoing as an exception 
IS6. See Rutan, supra note 162, at IS2, IS5-S6; Grimm & Deise, supra note 7, at 24. 
IS7. FED. R. EVID. S04(b)(6). 
ISS. FED. R. EVID. S04(b)(6) advisory committee's note (quoting United States v. 
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 19S2)). 
IS9. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 
804(b)(6), 28 U.S.C.A., Hearsay Exception Based on Unavailable Witness' 
Wrongfully Procured Absence, 193 A.L.R. FED. 703, 710 (2007). 
190. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, S07 
(2005). 
191. DEL. R. EVID. S04(b)(6). 
192. 6 GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 6 § S04 (2006). 
193. HAW. R. EVID. S04(b)(7). 
194. Ky. R. EVID. S04(b)(5). 
195. MICH. R. EVID. S04(b)(6). 
196. N.D. R. EVID. S04(b)(6). 
197. OHIO R. EVID. R. S04(b)( 6). 
19S. PA. R. EVID. S04(b)(6). 
199. TENN. R. EVID. S04(b)(6). 
200. VT. R. EVID. S04(b)(6). 
201. See State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 9S P.3d 699, 704 (N.M. 2004). 
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to the rule against hearsay. 202 Many jurisdictions continue to 
judicially adopt the general concept of forfeiture by wrongdoing as an 
equitable doctrine, extinguishing a defendant's objection to the 
admission of hearsay evidence on Confrontation Clause grounds. 203 
Additionally, every federal circuit that has considered the doctrine 
of forfeiture by wrongdoing has accepted it. 204 Similarly, some state 
courts have elected to adopt the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine as 
well. 205 
202. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/115-1O.2a (West 2007). Illinois enacted a 
statute in 2003 that provides for the admissibility of prior hearsay statements in 
domestic violence prosecutions if: (I) the prior statement is not covered by another 
hcarsay exception but possesses equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, (2) the witness is a crime victim who is unavailable to testify 
because of intimidation by the defendant, (3) the statement is offered as evidence of a 
material fact, (4) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered 
than any other evidence that the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts, 
and (5) the interests of justice are served by admission of the statement. Id. 
203. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 168 (Mass. 2005). 
204. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying FED. R. 
EVID. 804(b)(6»; United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 651 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]his 
Court, as well as a majority of our sister circuits, have also applied the waiver-by-
misconduct rule in cases where the defendant has wrongfully procured the witnesses' 
silence through threats, actual violence or murder."); United States v. Johnson, 219 
F.3d 349, 356 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6»; United States v. 
Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[A] defendant who wrongfully 
procures a witness's absence for the purpose of denying the government that witnes's 
testimony waives his right under the Confrontation Clause to object to the admission 
of the absent witness's hearsay statements."); Steele V. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 
(6th Cir. 1982) ("The law prefers live testimony over hearsay, a preference designed 
to protect everyone, particularly the defendant. A defendant cannot prefer the law's 
preference and profit from it, as the Supreme Court said in Reynolds [sic], while 
repudiating that preference by creating the condition that prevents it."); United States 
v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[A] defendant who causes a witness to 
be unavailable for trial for the purpose of preventing that witness from testifying also 
waives his right to confrontation under the Zerbst standard," because "[t]he law 
simply cannot countenance a defendant deriving benefits from murdering the chief 
witness against him."), superseded on limited grounds by rule, FED. R. EVID. 
804(b)(6), as recognized in United States V. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1028 (lIth Cir. 
2001); United States V. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979) ("[U]nder the 
common law principle that one should not profit by his own wrong, coercion can 
constitute voluntary waiver of the right of confrontation."); United States V. Carlson, 
547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976) ("Nor should the law permit an accused to 
subvert a criminal prosecution by causing witnesses not to testify at trial who have, at 
the pretrial stage, disclosed information which is inculpatory as to the accused. To 
permit the defendant to profit from such conduct would be contrary to public policy, 
common sense and the underlying purpose of the [C]onfrontation [C]lause."). 
205. See, e.g., State v. Valencia, 924 P.2d 497, 502 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); People V. 
Moore, 117 P.3d 1,5 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); Devonshire v. United States, 691 A.2d 
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The doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing requires proof that: (1) 
the declarant is unavailable, (2) the declarant was expected to be a 
witness, (3) the defendant acted with the intent to prevent the 
declarant from testifying, and (4) there is a nexus between the 
defendant's acts and the unavailability of the declarant. 206 The 
wrongful conduct that forfeited or waived a defendant's 
Confrontation Clause rights in these cases included use of force, 
threats, persuasion, control, wrongful non-disclosure of information, 
collusion, and "direction to a witness to exercise the [F]ifth 
[A]mendment privilege.,,207 
Some courts have held that the forfeiture of wrongdoing doctrine 
applies to the defendant even when the alleged wrongdoing in 
procuring witness unavailability is the same conduct for which the 
defendant is on trial. 208 In Commonwealth v. Edwards, 209 
Massachusetts held that the nexus between a defendant's actions and 
the witness's unavailability was shown when "(1) a defendant puts 
forward to a witness the idea to avoid testifying, either by threats, 
coercion, persuasion, or pressure; (2) a defendant physically prevents 
a witness from testifying; or (3) a defendant actively facilitates the 
carrying out of the witness's independent intent not to testify.,,210 
165, 168-69 (D.C. 1997); State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351, 358 (Iowa 2000); 
Wildennuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 514, 530 A.2d 275, 284 n.IO (1987) 
(acknowledging the concept of forfeiture or waiver of the right to confrontation, 
citing United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1979), but not squarely 
addressing the issue); State v. Fields, 679 N.W.2d 341, 347 (Minn. 2004); State v. 
Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1345-48 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); State v. 
Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d 699,703-05 (N.M. 2004); People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 
821 (N.Y. 1995); Commonwealth v. Paddy, 800 A.2d 294, 310 (Pa. 2002); State v. 
Boyes, Nos. 2003-CA-0050 to 0051, 2004 WL 1486333, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. June 
21,2004). 
206. See James F. Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing and Those Who Acquiesce in 
Witness Intimidation: A Reach Exceeding Its Grasp and Other Problems with 
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 459, 479-87 (2003); King-
Ries, supra note 155, at 454-55. 
207. Steele, 684 F .2d at 120 I (holding that witness's prior statement to law enforcement 
could be admitted at trial even though the witness later refused to testity because the 
witness was under the control of defendants and defense counsel, who procured her 
unavailability by counseling her to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination); see also United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985); 
Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1360. 
208. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2005); Moore, 
117 P.3d at 5; State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 794-95 (Kan. 2004); Gonzalez v. State, 
155 S.W.3d 603,610-11 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004). 
209. 830 N.E.2d 158 (Mass. 2005). 
210. Id. at 171. 
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In each of these cases, the courts explained that, although the Sixth 
Amendment protects a defendant's right to confront witnesses, 
"courts will not suffer a party to profit by his [ or her] own 
wrongdoing," and testimonial statements made by witnesses who are 
unavailable because of a defendant's misconduct may be admitted 
. 'd 211 mto eVI ence. 
When addressing constitutional challenges to the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine, some courts utilize the word "waiver" rather 
than "forfeiture.,,212 In Johnson v. Zerbst,213 the Supreme Court 
recognized that an accused can waive a fundamental constitutional 
right, provided the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently.214 
By contrast, forfeiture of a right involves the loss of a right or 
privilege "because of a crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of 
duty.,,215 
One scholar has argued that it is most appropriate to analyze the 
doctrine as an implicit waiver of constitutional rights because the 
conceptualization of constitutional rights as a "benefit" to a criminal 
defendant that the defendant then "forfeits" by committin~ a crime 
obscures the true nature of individual constitutional rights.2 6 Others 
argue that, analytically, the concept of forfeiture more accurately 
describes the penalty a defendant suffers for his or her misconduct 
because a defendant, by murdering a witness, cannot reasonably be 
said to have made a "voluntary and intelligent" choice to waive a 
constitutional right.217 The Advisory Committee to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 804(b)( 6) used the word forfeiture rather than waiver: (1) in 
part because forfeiture conveys the idea that the loss of this right is a 
penalty for misconduct, and (2) in part because the knowing and 
211. United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Edwards, 830 
N.E.2d at 168-70 (holding that collusion with a witness to prevent the witness from 
testifying is sufficient to trigger the issue of forfeiture by wrongdoing). 
212. _ See Enrico B. Valdez & Shelley A. Nieto Dahlberg, Tales from the Crypt: An 
Examination of Forfeiture by Misconduct and Its Applicability to the Texas Legal 
System, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 99, 104, 105 & n.25, 106 & nn.26-27 (1999) (citing 
United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. 1982), superseded on limited grounds by rule, 
FED. R. EVlD. 804(b)(6), as recognized in United States v. Ziatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 
1028 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Stephens, 609 F.2d 230, 232 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1358» (citations omitted); see also David J. Tess, Note, Losing 
the Right to Confront: Defining Waiver to Better Address a Defendant's Actions and 
Their Effects on a Witness, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 877, 882 (1994). 
213. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
214. fd. at 464-65. 
215. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 677 (8th ed. 2004). 
216. Flanagan, supra note 165, at 1240-41. 
217. See Grimm & Deise, supra note 7, at 23-24. 
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intelligent requirement of a waiver of constitutional rights might 
require notification to the defendant that witness intimidation would 
result in loss of Confrontation Clause objections to the use of such 
witness statements at trial. 218 
Both arguments have merit, and this article does not seek to resolve 
the debate on whether to characterize this concept as forfeiture or 
waiver of confrontation rights. Rather, because of its predominant 
usage, the article will use the term forfeiture by wrongdoing. 
B. Post-Crawford 
Crawford, in dicta, made reference to the concept of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing without explicitly ruling on its constitutionality, noting 
that the Roberts test was an impermissible substitution for the 
constitutionally-approved method of testing the reliability of a 
statement (cross-examination): 
The Roberts test allows a jury to hear evidence, untested 
by the adversary process, based on a mere judicial 
determination of reliability. It thus replaces the 
constitutionally prescribed method of assessing reliability 
with a wholly foreign one. In this respect, it is very 
different from exceptions to the Confrontation Clause that 
make no claim to be a surrogate means of assessing 
reliability. For example, the rule of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation 
claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not Rurport 
to be an alternative means of determining reliability.2 9 
Crawford thus indicated that the concept of forfeiture of 
confrontation rights through misconduct (as articulated in Reynolds 
and applied in various federal and state cases) survived because it did 
not act as a substitute method for determining the reliability of a 
statement. Post-Crawford, numerous federal circuit and district court 
cases,220 and state appellate court cases,221 have addressed the 
218. Valdez & Dahlberg, supra note 212, at 104-06, 128-29; see Alycia Sykora, 
Comment. Forfeiture by Misconduct: Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 
75 OR. L. REV. 855,860-61 (1996). 
219. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,62 (2004). 
220. See, e.g., United States v. Montague, 421 F.3d 1099, 1101-02 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(Sutton, J. dissenting); United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895, 912-19 (6th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227,240-43 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Rodriguez-
Marrero, 390 F.3d I, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Battle, 473 F. Supp. 2d 
1185,1195 (S.D. Fla. 2006); United States v. Johnson, 403 F. Supp. 2d 721,813-14 
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concept of forfeiture by wrongdoing, many of which referred to 
Crawford in their analysis. 222 
In 2006, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of testimonial 
hearsay in both Davis and Hammon in the context of domestic 
violence cases. 223 The Supreme Court also addressed the doctrine of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing, which it recognized as a means of 
preventing a defendant from exploiting Crawford through his or her 
own misconduct: 
Respondents in both cases, joined by a number of their 
amici, contend that the nature of the offenses charged in 
these two cases-domestic violence-requires greater 
flexibility in the use of testimonial evidence. This particular 
type of crime is notoriously susceptible to intimidation or 
coercion of the victim to ensure that she does not testify at 
trial. When this occurs, the Confrontation Clause gives the 
criminal a windfall. We may not, however, vitiate 
constitutional guarantees when they have the effect of 
allowing the guilty to go free. But when defendants seek to 
undermine the judicial process by procuring or coercing 
silence from witnesses and victims, the Sixth Amendment 
does not require courts to acquiesce. While defendants have 
no duty to assist the State in proving their guilt, they do 
have the duty to refrain from acting in ways that destroy the 
integrity of the criminal-trial system. We reiterate what we 
said in Crawford: that "the rule of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing. .. extinguishes confrontation claims on 
essentially equitable grounds." That is, one who obtains the 
(N.D. Iowa 2005), ajJ'd in part, remanded in part, No. 06-1001, 2007 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 18059 at *43-47 (8th Cir. July 30, 2007); United States v. Lentz, 384 F. 
Supp. 2d 934, 942-45 (E.D. Va. 2005); United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 
961,966-70 (S.D. Ohio 2005); United States v. Honken, 381 F. Supp. 2d 936, 996 
(N.D. Ohio 2005). 
221. See, e.g., People v. Pantoja, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 499 (Ct. App. 2004); People v. 
Moore, 117 P.3d 1,5 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); People v. Purcell, 846 N.E.2d 203, 217 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2006); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 165-70 (Mass. 
2005); People v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 362, 366-67 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006); People v. 
Bauder, 712 N.W.2d 506, 512-15 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 
842, 849-50 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006), ajJ'd, 156 P.3d 694 (N.M. 2007); State v. Hand, 
840 N.E.2d 151, 171-72 (Ohio 2006); Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W.3d 603, 609-10 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2004), affd, 195 S.W.3d 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Virgin Islands 
v. George, 47 V.1. 46, 59-61 (2004). 
222. See, e.g., Montague, 421 F.3d at 1101-02; Johnson, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 814; State v. 
Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 794 (Kan. 2004); State v. Henderson, 129 P.3d 646, 650--52 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2006); Edwards, 830 N.E.2d at 166-67; State v. Fields, 679 N.W.2d 
341,347 (Minn. 2004); State v. Hale, 691 N.W.2d 637, 651-52 (Wis. 2005). 
223. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
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absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the 
constitutional right to confrontation. 224 
229 
As recognized by the Court, in the world of testimonial hearsay, 
post-Crawford, the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing has assumed 
greater importance in evidentiary battles over admissibility of hearsay 
statements by unavailable, out-of-court declarants. Prior to 
Crawford, when the Roberts test controlled, a prosecutor needed only 
to persuade the trial court of the reliability of a statement as a 
condition of its admission. 225 After Crawford, prosecutors must rely 
much more heavily on the forfeiture doctrine and must demonstrate 
that the defendant procured the unavailability of the witness. 226 
VI. PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER THE 
DEFENDANT HAS FORFEITED CRA WFORD 
CONFRONT A TION BY WRONGDOING 
The Supreme Court acknowledged the doctrine of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing in Crawford and referred to the doctrine, with approval, 
in Davis, the first application of Crawford. The Court stated: 
We take no position on the standards necessary to 
demonstrate such forfeiture, but federal courts using Federal 
Rule of Evidence 804(b)( 6), which codifies the forfeiture 
doctrine, have generally held the Government to the 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. State courts tend 
to follow the same practice. Moreover, if a hearing on 
forfeiture is required, Edwards, for instance, observed that 
"hearsay evidence, including the unavailable witness's out-
of-court statements, may be considered." The Roberts 
approach to the Confrontation Clause undoubtedly made 
recourse to this doctrine less necessary, because prosecutors 
could show the "reliability" of ex parte statements more 
easily than they could show the defendant's procurement of 
the witness's absence. Crawford, in overruling Roberts, did 
not destroy the ability of courts to protect the integrity of 
h . d· 227 t elf procee lOgS. 
224. Id. at 2279-80 (citations omitted). 
225. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,61-62 (2004). 
226. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text. 
227. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court indicated that, 
absent a specific finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing by the Indiana Supreme Court, 
the out-of-court testimonial hearsay statement in Hammon was excluded on 
Confrontation Clause grounds, but noted that the "Indiana courts may [if they are 
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In Davis, the Court expressly declined to rule on the type of 
evidentiary hearing and the burden of persuasion required to 
demonstrate that a defendant forfeits the right to object to testimonial, 
hearsay statements on Confrontation Clause grounds. 228 
Thus, an open question remains as to what, if any, constitutional 
requirements exist for the determination of whether the defendant has 
forfeited his or her constitutional rights through wrongdoing. Must 
there be a hearing or is a proffer from the prosecutor sufficient? If 
there is a hearing, does the hearing apply the informal rules of 
evidence typically used during pre-trial motion hearings or must strict 
rules of evidence be used? 
Regardless of the nature of the hearing, because a finding of 
wrongdoing means the defendant loses all Crawford confrontation 
rights, how certain must the court be that the defendant committed 
wrongdoing? Stated alternatively, what risk of error in that fact 
finding can due process tolerate and does due process require clear 
and convincing evidence or merely preponderance of the evidence? 
The Supreme Court has not yet resolved these issues. Nonetheless, 
the Court's dicta lean in the direction of: (1) a hearing, (2) a lower 
burden of persuasion, i.e., preponderance of the evidence and not 
clear and convincing evidence, and (3) relaxed rules of evidence, i.e., 
hearsay to determine the admissibility of hearsay. 229 
The Court acknowledged that, under the federal rule and in the 
majority of state courts, the prosecution need only prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant procured the 
unavailability of the witness. 23o The Court also appeared to endorse 
the notion that, when an independent evidentiary hearing is required 
to make such a determination, the court may employ relaxed rules of 
evidence and use hearsay. 231 
Ultimately, the Court will have to decide whether the Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation, as understood in Crawford: (I) 
requires an independent evidentiary hearing, (2) requires strict rules 
of evidence, and/or (3) requires a burden of persuasion greater than 
the 51-to-49 preponderance of the evidence. 
asked] detennine on remand whether a claim of forfeiture by wrongdoing . . . is 
properly raised ... and, if so, whether it is meritorious." [d. at 2270. 
228. [d. at 2280. 
229. See id. 
230. See id. 
231. See id. 
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A. Evidentiary Hearing Requirement 
Historically, there has been no consistent federal approach to 
whether an independent evidentiary hearing was required for a trial 
court to find that a defendant waived or forfeited Confrontation 
Clause objections to hearsay statements of unavailable witnesses. 232 
The Tenth Circuit, in 1979, in Balano,233 and the Second Circuit, in 
1982, in Mastrangelo,234 both required an evidentiary hearing outside 
the presence of the jury as a predicate to determine whether the 
defendant procured the absence of the witness. However, the First,235 
Fifth,236 Sixth,237 and Eighth Circuits238 did not expressly require 
such a hearing. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) did not answer the question of 
whether an independent evidentiary hearing is required. Presumably, 
a forfeiture by wrongdoing hearing would be a preliminary hearing 
and thus governed by Federal Rule of Evidence I04(a), which 
requires only an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the 
jury.239 "Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted 
when the interests of justice require, or when an accused is a witness 
and so requests.,,240 Thus, the federal rules do not mandate an 
independent, evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant 
procured the witness' unavailability and thereby forfeited his or her 
confrontation rights through wrongdoing. 
232. See infra notes 233-38 and accompanying text. 
233. United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979). 
234. United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982). 
235. United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1281 n.5 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct an independent 
evidentiary hearing thirty-seven days after the trial commenced). 
236. In United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 627 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth Circuit 
discussed admission of such testimony under the residual hearsay exception codified 
in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5), which only requires sufficient notice to the 
opposing party of intent to use the hearsay statement in advance of trial or hearing. 
237. See Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1199, 1203-04 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that a 
trial court may use hearsay evidence at trial, under the forfeiture doctrine, "based on 
[the judge's] observation of the witness, the evidence introduced in the case, and the 
course of events leading to the impasse"). 
238. In United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir. 1976), the Eighth Circuit 
discussed admission of such evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5), 
requiring "that notice be given to the adverse party prior to the trial or hearing to 
inform him [or her] that the hearsay statement will be used at trial," and did not 
expressly rule on whether an evidentiary hearing is required. Id. at 1353, 1355. 
239. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
240. FED. R. EVID. 1 04( c). 
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Moreover, federal cases decided subsequent to the 1997 adoption 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) are not uniform. In United 
States v. Scott, 24 1 the Seventh Circuit adopted the preponderance of 
the evidence standard for such evidentiary hearings without holding 
whether an evidentiary hearin,& is required (in Scott, the trial court 
conducted such a hearing). 2 Conversely, in United States v. 
Zlatogur, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the preponderance of the 
evidence standard for such evidentiary hearings also without holding 
whether an evidentiary hearing is required (in Zlatogur, it was 
unclear whether the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing). 243 
Some federal circuits have expressly held that there is no 
requirement for a separate evidentiary hearing if the requisite 
findings that the defendant intentionally procured witness 
unavailability can be made based on the evidence at trial, e.g., the 
defendant is on trial for murdering the witness. 244 In United States v. 
Emery,245 the Eighth Circuit held that a trial court need not conduct 
an independent evidentiary hearing and may admit testimonial 
hearsay of an unavailable witness "contingent upon proof of the 
underlying murder by a preponderance of the evidence.,,246 The 
court noted that this procedure is used when determining whether to 
admit hearsay statements of a co-conspirator. 247 There is "similarity 
of the questions involved and ... the repetition necessarily inherent 
with a preliminary hearing would amount to a significant waste of 
judicial resources.,,248 
The Fourth Circuit adopted this position in United States v. 
Johnson. 249 In Johnson, the defendant was char~ed with, and 
convicted of, murdering the unavailable witness. 25 The Fourth 
Circuit determined that sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to 
show that the defendant caused the witness's unavailability, thereby 
making a separate evidentiary hearing unnecessary. 251 
241. 284 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2002). 
242. Id. at 762. 
243. 271 F.3d 1025, 1028-29 (lith Cir. 2001). 
244. See, e.g., United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that, 
instead of holding a preliminary hearing, courts may admit "the evidence at trial in 
the presence of the jury contingent upon proof of the underlying murder by a 
preponderance of the evidence"). 
245. Id. at 921. 
246. Id. at 926. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
249. 219 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2000). 
250. !d. at 352. 
251. Id. at 357. 
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Other federal jurisdictions hold that an evidentiary hearing is 
required, and that it must take place outside the presence of the jur¥3 
following the Second Circuit's lead in Mastrangelo 252 and Dhinsa. 2 
The Dhinsa Court also held that the failure to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing violates the Confrontation Clause, but that such violation is 
subject to the harmless error doctrine. 254 In Balano, the Tenth Circuit 
held that an evidentiary hearing in the absence of the jury would 
provide the most appropriate means to facilitate a balance between 
the need to determine whether a defendant coerced a witness and the 
desire to avoid "emasculat[ing] the Confrontation Clause merely to 
facilitate government prosecutions.,,255 Though overruled on other 
grounds, the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed Balano's hearing requirement 
in United States v. Cherry. 256 Cherry confirmed it had become 
established in the Tenth Circuit that an evidentiary hearing, out of the 
jury's presence, was required to determine whether a defendant 
procured the unavailability of a witness. 257 
Among state courts, some require an evidentiary hearing outside 
the presence of the jury to determine if forfeiture has occurred.258 In 
New York, if the prosecution demonstrates a "distinct possibility" 
that the defendant's wrongdoing procured witness unavailability, an 
evidentiary hearing is required, during which the prosecution must 
prove its claim by clear and convincin¥ evidence. 259 
In Commonwealth v. Edwards, 26 Massachusetts held that an 
evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury is required. 261 In 
State v. Valencia/62 Arizona likewise required an evidentiary 
hearing. 263 In State v. Henry,264 Connecticut held that an evidentiary 
252. United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982); see Valdez & 
Dahlberg, supra note 212, at 124. 
253. United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2001). 
254. /d. at 656. 
255. United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (lOth Cir. 1979), overruled on other 
grounds by Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317,325-26 (1984). 
256. 217 F .3d 811, 815 (lOth Cir. 2000) (quoting Balano, 618 F .2d at 629). 
257. Id. 
258. See, e.g., State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351,355-56 (Iowa 2000). 
259. People v. Johnson, 250 A.D.2d 922, 924 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Holtzman v. 
Hellenbrand, 92 A.D.2d 405, 415 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). 
260. 830 N .E.2d 158 (Mass. 2005). 
261. Id. at 174. 
262. 924 P.2d 497 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). 
263. Id. at 502 (citing United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 814 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 
513 U.S. 977, 993 (l994); United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir.1992); 
United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982). 
264. 820 A.2d 1076 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003), cert. denied, 826 A.2d 178 (Conn. 2003). 
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hearing in the absence of the jury is required to determine, by clear 
and convincing evidence, whether the defendant procured the 
unavailability of the witness. 265 
An Illinois statute permits out-of-court hearsay statements in 
domestic violence cases, but makes no provision for an independent 
evidentiary hearing. 266 The statute provides: 
A statement may not be admitted under this exception 
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party 
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the 
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, 
the proponent's intention to offer the statement, and the 
particulars of the statement, including the name and address 
of the declarant. 267 
B. Rules of Evidence During an Evidentiary Hearing 
For federal courts applying Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), a 
court conducting a hearing on preliminary questions is not bound by 
the rules of evidence, except with respect to testimonial privilege. In 
United States v. Mastrangelo, the Second Circuit held that, although 
an independent evidentiary hearing on forfeiture is required, the 
hearing is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), which 
provides that evidentiary exclusionary rules (other than privilege) are 
inapplicable. 268 Accordingly, the hearsay statement of the absent 
witness, for example, may be considered by the trial court. 269 
The case law is frequently silent on whether relaxed or strict rules 
of evidence are applicable in evidentiary hearings on forfeiture by 
wrongdoing. The trend, however, appears to allow relaxed rules of 
evidence, such that hearsay is admissible. 27o 
In Commonwealth v. Edwards, 27 1 in which Massachusetts 
judicially adopted the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, the court 
referred to Mastrangelo and expressly held that relaxed rules of 
evidence are appropriate, analogizing the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
hearing to hearings on motions to suppress. 272 The court explained 
265. Id. at 1088. 
266. See 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. 51115-10.2 (2002). 
267. Id. 51115- JO.2(b). 
268. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273. 
269. Id.; see United States V. Balano, 618 F.2d 624,629 (10th Cir. 1979) ("We recognize 
that often the only evidence of coercion will be the statement of the coerced person, 
as repeated by government agents."). 
270. See infra notes 271-79 and accompanying text. 
271. 830 N.E.2d 158 (Mass. 2005). 
272. Id. at 173. 
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that "the hearing is not intended to be a mini-trial, and accordingly, 
hearsay evidence, including the unavailable witness's out-of-court 
statements, may be considered.,,273 
Consistent with Edwards, a New Jersey court referred to its rules 
on preliminary determinations of the admissibility of evidence in 
State v. Sheppard,274 and held that the trial court is not bound by 
strict rules of evidence and may use hearsay evidence (but not 
evidence subject to evidentiary privileges) in making that preliminary 
determination. 275 The court was persuaded by the Second Circuit 
decision in Mastrangelo. 276 Even New York, which requires the 
more stringent clear and convincing evidence standard of persuasion, 
allows hearsay evidence to be used in the evidentiary hearing. 277 
Other state courts, although not squarely addressing the issue, 
appear to permit informal rules of evidence and often cite with 
approval federal cases such as Mastrangelo and Federal Rule of 
Evidence 804(b)(6) as support. 278 One court, in dicta, went so far as 
to suggest that the court may rule on the admissibility of the witness's 
out-of-court statement based solely on a proffer from the 
prosecutor. 279 
C. Burden of Persuasion in an Evidentiary Hearing 
Although Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b )(6) does not specifically 
set forth a burden of persuasion standard for forfeiture by 
wrongdoing hearings, the Advisory Committee indicated in its notes 
that the majority of federal circuits apply a preponderance of the 
evidence standard. "The usual Rule 104(a) preponderance of the 
evidence standard has been adopted in light of the behavior the new 
Rule 804(b)(6) seeks to discourage.,,28o 
273. /d. at 174. 
274. 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984). 
275. ld. at 1347. 
276. ld. 
277. See People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 823 n.4 (N.Y. 1995). 
278. See, e.g., State v. Henry, 820 A.2d 1076, 1082-83 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003); State v. 
Gettings, 769 P.2d 25, 29 (Kan. 1989); State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d 699, 703 
(N.M. 2004); cf People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1,5 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (stating "there 
is no dispute that the victim was unavailable to testify because of her death and that 
her death was the result of defendant's actions," without indicating whether the trial 
court should have followed any procedural or evidentiary rules before coming to that 
determination). 
279. Devonshire v. United States, 691 A.2d 165, 168-69 (D.C. 1997). 
280. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's note. 
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In tum, Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) does not specifically set 
forth the burden of persuasion that the prosecution bears on 
preliminary questions of fact, but the Advisory Committee's notes 
cite to Supreme Court precedent placing the burden of persuasion, for 
prelimina~ questions, on the moving party by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 2 I In forfeiture by wrongdoing hearings, the critical fact is 
whether the party seeking to prevent the admission of the out-of-court 
statement procured the unavailability of the witness. 282 
Prior to the 1997 codification of the federal forfeiture rule, the 
Eleventh Circuit (when it was part of the Fifth Circuit) was the on~ 
federal circuit to require proof by clear and convincing evidence. 2 
Later, in United States v. Zlatogur,284 the Eleventh Circuit overruled 
this precedent, adopting the preponderance of the evidence 
standard. 285 Thus, today all federal circuits and a majority of state 
courts that have addressed this issue have adopted the preponderance 
of the evidence standard. 286 
Among the states, for example, in Commonwealth v. Edwards,287 
Massachusetts adopted the preponderance of the evidence standard in 
281. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) advisory committee's note; Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 
171,179(1987). 
282. United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272 (1982); see Valdez & Dahlberg, 
supra note 212, at 124. 
283. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th Cir. 1982), superseded on limited 
grounds by rule, FED. R. EVlD. 804(b)(6), as recognized in United States v. Zlatogur, 
271 F.3d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001). 
284. 271 F.3d 1025. 
285. Jd. at 1028. The Fifth Circuit, in an unreported decision, in United States v. Nelson, 
No. 06-60487, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 17582, at *14 (5th Cir. Jul. 24, 2007), 
observed that "United States v. Thevis was overruled by FED. R. EVlD. 804(b)(6), so 
now only proof by a preponderance is required." The court noted that preponderance 
of the evidence is the standard for an objection rooted in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, but the standard "may well be higher" when dealing with objections based 
on the Confrontation Clause. !d. at * 14 n.2. 
286. See Nelson, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS at * 14 n.2; United States v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227, 
241 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 2002); 
Zlatogur, 271 F.3d at 1028; United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 653-54 (2nd Cir. 
2001); United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811,815 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 927 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 913 
(D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1280 (1st Cir. 1996); 
Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982); State v. Valencia, 924 P.2d 
497,502 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Devonshire v. United States, 691 A.2d 165, 169 
(D.C. 1997); State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351, 355-56 (Iowa 2000); State v. 
Gettings, 769 P.2d 25, 29 (Kan. 1989); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 
172 (Mass. 2005); State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1348 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1984); State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d 699,704 (N.M. 2004). 
287. 830 N.E.2d 158. 
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line with the general proposition of law that all preliminary questions 
of fact are subject to a preponderance of the evidence standard, and in 
keeping with the standard of proof used to determine whether a 
conspiracy or joint venture existed for purposes of admitting an out-
of-court statement of a co-conspirator under that particular exception 
to the rule against hearsay. 288 
In United States v. Mayhew,289 the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Ohio addressed the dilemma presented by 
applying a preponderance of the evidence standard when the very act 
upon which a court made the preliminary determination of forfeiture 
by wrongdoing by the defendant was the same act for which the 
defendant is on trial. 290 In Mayhew, the defendant was on trial for 
murdering his daughter after he shot and killed his ex-girlfriend and 
engaged in a high-speed chase with officers. 29 1 The defendant's 
daughter was interviewed b~ a police officer in the ambulance, where 
he recorded her statement. 92 She died in the hospital,293 and the 
defendant sought to exclude the recorded statements on 
Confrontation Clause grounds. 294 The court stated that "[ r ]equiring 
the court to decide by a preponderance of the evidence the very 
question for which the defendant is on trial may seem, at first glance, 
troublesome. ,,295 
Nonetheless, the court concluded that: (1) a defendant should 
receive no benefit from wrongdoing,296 (2) the jury would not learn 
of the preliminary determination that the defendant procured the 
wrongdoing,297 (3) the jury would apply the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard to determine guilt,298 and (4) the trial court may, in 
other evidentiary situations, determine preliminary questions of fact, 
even though those facts would be part of the jury's ultimate 
consideration, e.g., whether a defendant was a co-conspirator for 
allowing statements offered to show the defendant's participation in a 
. 299 
conspIracy. 
288. [d. at 172-73. 
289. 380 F. Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Ohio 2005). 
290. [d. at 967-68. 
291. [d. at 963. 
292. [d. 
293. [d. 
294. [d. at 963. 
295. [d. at 967. 
296. [d. at 968. 
297. See id. 
298. !d. 
299. [d. 
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Only a few states have ado~ted a clear and convincing evidence 
standard. In People v. Geraci, 00 the Court of Appeals of New York 
characterized the preponderance of the evidence standard as 
"relatively undemanding," and concluded that the clear and 
convincing evidence standard was the "more exacting standard? 
which is the one most protective of the truth-seeking process.,,30 
The court explained: 
Because human fact finders lack the quality of 
omniscience, the process of determining the truth in 
adjudicative proceedings necessarily involves some margin 
of error. The size of the margin of error that the law is 
willing to tolerate varies in inverse proportion to the 
importance to the party or to society of the issue to be 
resolved. On one end of the spectrum are most civil 
disputes, where, from a societal standpoint, "a mistaken 
judgment for the plaintiff is no worse than a mistaken 
judgment for the defendant". On the other end are criminal 
determinations of guilt or innocence, "[ w ]here one party has 
at stake an interest of transcendent value". The rules 
governing how persuasive the proof must be "[represent] an 
attempt to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of 
confidence our society thinks. .. should [be had] in the 
correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of 
adjudication." Viewing the issue in light of this 
fundamental principle, we deem the "clear and convincing 
evidence" standard to be the test that best recognizes the 
gravity of the interest at stake and most effectively balances 
the need to reduce the risk of error a~ainst the practical 
difficulties of proving witness tampering. 02 
A determination that the defendant has procured a witness's 
unavailability results in the admission of hearsay statements and the 
forfeiture of the right to cross-examine the witness about the 
substance of those statements. Obviously, a defendant's loss of the 
valued Sixth Amendment confrontation right constitutes a substantial 
deprivation. Additionally, and even more significantly, society has a 
weighty investment in the outcome, "[b ]ecause of the intimate 
300. 649 N.E.2d 817 (N.Y. 1995). 
30 I. Id. at 821. 
302. Id. at 821-22. 
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association between the right to confrontation and the accuracy of the 
fact-finding process.,,303 
In this regard, it is significant that, unlike most exceptions to the 
rule against hearsay, the exception at issue here is justified not by the 
inherent reliability of the evidence, but rather by the public policy of 
reducing the incentive to tamper with witnesses. Indeed, hearsay 
evidence such as the Grand Jury testimony at issue here is especially 
troubling because "although given under oath, [it] is not subjected to 
the vigorous truth testing of cross-examination.,,304 "Furthermore, 
Grand Jury testimony is often obtained through grants of immunity, 
leading questions, and reduced attention to the rules of evidence-
conditions which tend to impair its reliability.,,30s 
These factors militate in favor of a standard of proof that 
is high enough to assure a great degree of accuracy in the 
determination of whether the defendant was, in fact, 
involved in procuring the witness's unavailability for live 
testimony. While we recognize the need for the use of this 
less trustworthy class of evidence when necessitated by the 
defendant's misconduct, we also believe that such use 
should be authorized only to the extent that the misconduct 
is clearly and convincingly shown. 306 
In 2007, in State v. Mason,307 the Supreme Court of Washington, 
citing to Geraci, adopted the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, and 
also adopted a clear and convincing standard of proof. 308 The court 
recognized that "[m]any critical evidentiary determinations, including 
those involving core constitutional rights, are made by trial judges 
based upon the preponderance standard,,,309 and that the 
preponderance of the evidence standard represented a majority 
approach. 31 0 
However, the court distinguished forfeiture by wrongdoing as 
"unique in that the trial judge must often rule on the ultimate 
303. Id. (quoting United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th Cir. 1982), superseded 
on limited grounds by rule, FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6), as recognized in United States v. 
Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
304. Id. at 822 (quoting Thevis, 665 F.2d at 629). 
305. Id. (citations omitted). 
306. Id. 
307. 162 P.3d 396 (Wash. 2007) (en banc). 
308. Id. at 404-05. 
309. Id. at 404. 
310. Id. 
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question: did the accused kill the alleged victim?,,311 The court 
concluded that it agreed with the reasoning of Geraci and adopted the 
minority approach, recognizing that, although the clear and 
convincing standard is a more difficult standard, "the right of 
confrontation should not be easily deemed forfeited by an 
accused.,,312 
Maryland appears to be the only state that has adopted, by statute, a 
clear and convincing standard of persuasion for hearings to determine 
forfeiture by wrongdoing. 313 In other states, like Connecticut, the 
appellate courts have yet to establish a standard of persuasion for 
these hearings, leaving "the question of the standard of proof required 
in cases such as this to another day.,,314 
VII. MARYLAND'S STATUTORY PROCEDURES FOR 
DETERMINING FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING 
Maryland is one of the few states that have adopted the minority 
approach to procedural requirements regarding application of the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, and Maryland is the only state to 
have adopted the more defense-oriented posture on all three sub-
issues-an independent evidentiary hearing, strict rules of evidence, 
and a burden of persuasion requiring clear and convincing 
evidence. 315 
In order to understand the reason why Maryland took this 
approach, it is important to possess a contextual understanding of 
Maryland's approach to post-Crawford cases and the public debate 
over how to address witness intimidation in the post-Crawford era. 316 
Although no Maryland case squarely addresses the topic of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing,317 the citizens of Maryland are familiar 
311. Id. 
312. Id. at 404-05. 
313. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-90 I (LexisNexis 2006). 
314. State v. Henry, 820 A.2d 1076,1088 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003). 
315. See infra notes 328-30 and accompanying text. 
316. In three cases not discussed in this article, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
either held that the Crawford issue was not preserved or declined to review it. See 
Adams v. State, 165 Md. App. 352, 444, 885 A.2d 833, 886 (2005); Collins v. State, 
164 Md. App. 582,598,884 A.2d 181, 191 (2005); Logan v. State, 164 Md. App. I, 
74, 882 A.2d 330, 372 (2005). 
317. In 1987, the Court of Appeals of Maryland made what appears to be the only 
reference to the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in Maryland case law. In 
Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 514, 530 A.2d 275,284 n.1O (1987), the court 
acknowledged the concept of forfeiture or waiver of the right to confrontation but did 
not address the validity or applicability of the doctrine because it was not at issue in 
the case. 
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with the topic of forfeiture by wrongdoing, better known as "witness 
intimidation." This topic received much attention in 2004 when a 
group of individuals released a two-hour "Stop Snitching" DVD, 
which gained national coverage after a couple of months of 
circulation on the streets of Baltimore. 318 Later, officers responded 
with a "Keep Talking" DVD. 319 
In 2005, several high-profile cases of witness intimidation 
(including the firebombing of a witness's home that killed seven 
people) brought further attention to what prosecutors argue is a 
continual and substantial problem in getting witnesses to testify in 
criminal trials. 32o 
During the 2005 session of the Maryland General Assembly, 
legislators submitted a series of proposals attempting to: (1) increase 
the criminal penalty for witness intimidation32I and (2) codify 
exceptions to the general rule against hearsay and permitting out-of-
court testimonial statements by declarants who were intimidated from 
'f' 322 test! ymg. 
During that same period, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, known as 
the "Rules Committee,,,323 proposed a rule of court making the 
318. Ryan Davis, DVD's Producer Calls It a Glimpse of Reality, BALT. SUN, Dec. 29, 
2004, at B I, available at http://www.baltimoresun.comlnews/local/crime/bal-
dvd 1229,0,80 12.story. 
319. Ryan Davis, Police Hit Streets with Their Answer to 'Snitch' DVD, BALT. SUN, May 
II, 2005, at A I, available at http://www.baltimoresun.comlnews/local/crime/bal-
te.md.dvd II mayll ,0,4580772.story. 
320. Matthew Dolan, Victim Describes Fire Attack: Harwood Activist Testifies in Trial of 
3, BALT. SUN, Dec. 6, 2005, at BI, available at http://www.baltimoresun.comlnews/ 
local/crime/bal-md.harwood06dec06,0,668 I 446.story; Matthew Dolan, Dawson 
Family Survivors File Lawsuit Against Officials, Police, BALT. SUN, Feb. 18,2005, at 
B I, available at http://www.baltimoresun.comlnews/local/crime/bal-
dawson02l8,0,5070444.story. 
321. Under MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-303 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2007), it is a 
criminal misdemeanor for a person to intentionally harm another or damage or 
destroy property in retaliation for victim or witness testimony or reporting of a crime, 
subject to imprisonment not exceeding five years, a fine not exceeding $5,000, or 
both. In 2005, then-Governor Robert Ehrlich submitted a proposal to the legislature 
to increase the penalty to twenty years, but the law ultimately was not changed. Julie 
Bykowicz, Proposals Focus on Witnesses Who Are Intimidated, BALT. SUN, Jan. 20, 
2005, at B I, available at http://www.baltimoresun.comlnews/local/crime/bal-
md.witness20jan20,0,3521945.story. 
322. Bykowicz, supra note 321, at B I. 
323. In Maryland, the Court of Appeals has the power to promulgate rules governing legal 
practice and procedure in Maryland courts. MD. R. 16-801(a). The "Rules 
Committee" assists the Court of Appeals in exercising its rule-making power. MD. 
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forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine an exception to the rule against 
hearsay, but limiting the scope of the exception only to those 
statements given under oath by the unavailable witness, signed by the 
unavailable witness, or recorded in a near-verbatim fashion by 
I . h 324 e ectrollic means or a stenograp er. 
Then-Governor Robert Ehrlich proposed codification of a much 
broader exception, closer in scope to the federal rule. 325 During 
hearings before Maryland's General Assembly, proponents of the 
proposed legislation testified from the Governor's Office, the 
judiciary, and the Maryland State's Attorneys' Association.326 
Opponents to the bill testified from the Maryland Public Defender's 
Office, the Maryland Criminal Defense Attorney Association, and 
academia, arguing that the proposed legislation could infringe on the 
constitutional right of criminal defendants to confront the witnesses 
against them. 327 
The Maryland General Assembly: (1) adopted forfeiture by 
wrongdoing as an exception to the rule against hearsay328 and (2) 
codified the procedure for determinin9 whether the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing hearsay exception applies. 29 The procedure enacted 
made Maryland the only jurisdiction, whether by statute, court rule, 
or case law, to adopt a "defense-oriented" approach to forfeiture by 
wrongdoing on all three procedural issues-requiring a hearing, strict 
rules of evidence, and persuasion by clear and convincing evidence. 
First, although the statutory hearsay exception does not apply to all 
crimes, it aR~lies to cases of felony narcotics distribution and crimes 
of violence. 3 0 The statute provides: 
During the trial of a criminal case in which the defendant 
is charged with a felonious violation of Title 5 of the 
Criminal Law Article or with the commission of a crime of 
violence as defined in § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article, 
a statement as defined in Maryland Rule 5-801(a) is not 
R. 16-80 1 (b). The Rules Committee is composed of judges, lawyers, and those 
familiar with judicial administration. Id. 
324. Bykowicz, supra note 321, at B 1. 
325. Id. 
326. Julie Bykowicz, Witness-Intimidation Victims Urge the Passage of Legislation: Bills 
Would Increase Penalties. Change Rules on Statements in Court, BALT. SUN, Jan. 26, 
2005, at B I, available at http://www.baltimoresun.comlnews/locaVcrimelbal-
victimsO 126,0, 7409092.story. 
327. Id. 
328. MD. RULE 5-804(b)(5)(B). 
329. Act of May 26, 2005, ch. 446, 2005 Md. Laws 2510 (codified as amended at MD. 
CODE ANN. CTS. & JUO. PROC. § 10-901 (LexisNexis 2006». 
330. CTS. & JUO. PROC. § 10-901 § 10-901(a). 
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excluded by the hearsay rule if the statement is offered 
against a party that has engaged in, directed, or conspired to 
commit wrongdoing that was intended to and did procure 
the unavailability of the declarant of the statement, as 
defined in Maryland Rule 5-804. 331 
243 
Second, the statutory hearsay excef?tion requires a hearing to be 
held outside the presence of the jury.3 The statute provides, "before 
admitting a statement under this section, the court shall hold a 
hearing outside the presence of the jury .... ,,333 
Third, at this hearing, strict evidentiary rules (rather than relaxed 
rules of evidence) are required. 334 The statute provides that, during 
the hearing, "[t]he Maryland Rules of Evidence are strictly 
applied .... ,,335 
Fourth, the statute requires the prosecution to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence, rather than by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the defendant procured the witness's unavailability. 336 The 
statute provides that a statement may be admitted if "[t]he court finds 
by clear and convincing evidence that the party against whom the 
statement is offered engaged in, directed, or conspired to commit the 
wrongdoing that procured the unavailability of the declarant.,,337 
Fifth, the statute limits eligible out-of-court witness statements to 
those that are: (1) under oath, (2) in a signed writing, or (3) 
recorded. 338 The statute provides: 
A statement may not be admitted under this section 
unless: (1) [t]he statement was: (i) [g]iven under oath 
331. Id. In 2007, Senate Bill 779 and House Bill 1038 were introduced in the Maryland 
General Assembly. S. 779, 2007 Leg., 423rd Sess. (Md. 2007); H.D. 1038, 2007 
Leg., 423rd Sess. (Md. 2007). These bills, if enacted, would have expanded the list 
of offenses to which section 10-90 I applies. See S. 779; HD. 1038. The additional 
offenses would be second-degree assault, actual or attempted third-degree sexual 
offense, continuing course of conduct sexual offense with a child, incest, sexual 
solicitation of a minor, kidnapping a minor, child abuse, narcotics solicitation or 
conspiracy, and solicitation or conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. S. 779; 
H.D. 1038. House Bill 1038 was reported "unfavorable" by the House Judiciary 
Committee on March 5, 2007. H.D. 423-1038, 423rd Sess. (Md. 2007), 
http://mlis.state.md.us/2007RSlbillfilelhbI038.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2007). 
332. CTS.&JUD.PROC. § 10-901(b). 
333. Id. 
334. Id. § 10-90 I (b)(I). 
335. Id. 
336. Id. § 10-90 I (b )(2). 
337. Id. 
338. Id. § 10-90 I (c)( I). 
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subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other 
proceeding or in a deposition; (ii) [r]educed to writing and 
signed by the declarant; or (iii) [r]ecorded in substantially 
verbatim fashion by stenographic or electronic means 
contemporaneously with the making of the 
statement .... ,,339 
Finally, the statute requires that, "[a]s soon as is practicable after 
the proponent of the statement learns that the declarant will be 
unavailable, the proponent notifies the adverse party of: (i) [t]he 
intention to offer the statement; (ii) [t]he particulars of the statement; 
and (iii) [t]he identity of the witness through whom the statement will 
be offered.,,34o 
In response to the newly enacted section 10-901 of the Courts and 
Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland promulgated Maryland Rule 5-804(b), 
incorporating the statute as follows: 
A statement will not qualify under section (b) of this Rule 
if the unavailability is due to the procurement or 
wrongdoing of the proponent of the statement for the 
purpose of preventing the witness from attending or 
testifying. 
The following [is] not excluded by the hearsay rule if the 
declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(5) Witness unavailable because of party's wrongdoing .... 
(B) In criminal causes in which a witness is unavailable 
because of a party's wrongdoing, admission of the witness's 
statement under this exception is governed by Code, Courts 
Article, § 10-901. 341 , 
VIII. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Maryland approach to forfeiture by wrongdoing best ensures a 
constitutionally sound approach in deciding whether to strip a 
defendant of the right to confrontation. 342 First, the statute requires a 
339. ld. 
340. ld. § 10-901 (c )(2). 
341. MD. R. 5-804(b). 
342. See Grimm & Diese, supra note 7, at 39. 
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hearing to be conducted outside the presence of the jury. 343 Second, 
the statute requires that the hearing be conducted under strict 
evidentiary rules. 344 Third, the statute requires that the prosecution 
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that a defendant engaged in, 
directed, or conspired to commit wrongdoing that was intended to-
and actually did-procure the unavailability of the declarant. 345 
Moreover, the statute limits witness out-of-court statements to 
those that are under oath, in a signed writing, or recorded. 346 Finally, 
the statute requires that, as soon as is practicable after the proponent 
of the statement learns that the declarant will be unavailable, the 
proponent must notify the adverse party of the intention to offer the 
statement, the particulars of the statement, and the identity of the 
witness through whom the statement will be offered. 347 
Clearly, Maryland has taken what may be characterized as the most 
defense-oriented, pro-confrontation rights position with respect to 
determining whether forfeiture by wrongdoing is applicable, by 
requiring: (1) an independent evidentiary hearing, (2) the use of strict 
rules of evidence at that hearing, and (3) a burden of showin~ that 
such wrongdoing occurred by clear and convincing evidence. 3 On 
the opposite end of the spectrum, some jurisdictions require: (1) no 
independent evidentiary hearing,349 or (2J if a hearing is conducted, 
the use of relaxed rules of evidence,35 and/or (3) the burden of 
showing that such wrongdoing occurred by a preponderance of the 
343. CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-901(b). 
344. Id. § 10-90 I (b)( I). 
345. !d. § 10-90 I (b )(2). 
346. Id. § 10-90 I (c)(1). 
347. Id. § 10-90 I (c )(2). 
348. Compare id. § 10-901 with e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1350 (West 2006 & Supp. 2007) 
(requiring both clear and convincing evidence and a hearing outside the presence of 
the jury but making no mention of strict evidentiary rule), OHIO EVID. R. 804 
(requiring advance written notice of witness testimony, but setting forth no other 
procedural safeguards), and PA. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (requiring only that the defendant 
"engaged or acquiesced" in wrongdoing and silent regarding procedure of such 
determination). 
349. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 219 F.3d 349, 356 (4th Cir. 2000); United States 
v. Emery, 186 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1999). 
350. See, e.g., United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982); 
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 174 (Mass. 2005); State v. Sheppard, 
484 A.2d 1330, 1346 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984). 
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evidence. 351 Some jurisdictions take approaches that lie between 
these two ends of the spectrum. 352 
Ultimately, among the state and federal courts there are multiple 
approaches and no uniformity.353 To date, the Supreme Court has not 
ruled on whether the Constitution imposes a minimum standard or 
threshold on the determination of forfeiture by wrongdoing. 
However, given that the determination of applicability of the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine may cause a defendant to lose the 
right to confrontation, the Supreme Court should undoubtedly step in 
and resolve this dilemma. Despite the merits of Maryland's 
approach, the Supreme Court may be unwilling to mandate it as a 
constitutional requirement, in part because it does represent the 
"minority" approach. 354 In light of this, this article makes the 
following recommendations. 
A. Recommendation #1,' The Sixth Amendment Right to 
Confrontation and/or the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clauses Should Mandate the System Adopted by 
Maryland 
The questions for the Supreme Court are four-fold. First, is the 
Constitution implicated in a forfeiture by wrongdoing determination? 
Is the procedure for applying forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine 
controlled by: (1) the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, (2) the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses, or (3) no 
constitutional mandate? Second, if the Constitution is at issue, does 
the Constitution mandate a hearing? Third, if the Constitution is at 
issue, does it mandate the application of strict rules of evidence in 
determining whether a defendant has forfeited his or her Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause rights? Fourth, if the Constitution 
is at issue, does it mandate the application of clear and convincing 
evidence in fmding forfeiture by wrongdoing? 
As to the first question, it is hard to imagine how the application of 
the forfeiture by wrongdoing standard would not implicate the 
Constitution in some way. As a general rule, the evidentiary 
proceedings of state courts do not violate the Due Process Clause 
351. See, e.g., Edwards, 830 N.E.2d at 172; see also supra note 286. 
352. See, e.g., Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 274 ("Although we hold that the standard of proof 
should be a preponderance of the evidence, we suggest, in order to expedite any 
further proceedings, that the trial judge make findings under the clear and convincing 
standards as well."). 
353. See supra notes 232-314 and accompanying text. 
354. See Edwards, 830 N.E.2d at 172 (stating that the "majority of those states that have 
ruled on the standard of proof have similarly applied the preponderance standard"). 
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unless they "offend[] some principle of justice so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.,,355 In this case, the fundamental right at stake is the 
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 356 
As to the second question, if the prosecution argues forfeiture by 
wrongdoing, the Constitution should mandate a hearing. Allowing 
this issue to be resolved by proffer, with no opportunity to test it 
through the adversarial process, will likely result in erroneous 
findings of wrongdoing. Moreover, with constitutional rights at 
stake, the mere proffer of a prosecutor alone-who has a vested 
interest in winning the case against a defendant-cannot sufficiently 
safeguard a defendant's rights. 
As to the third question, if the Constitution is implicated, it further 
follows that the Constitution should require strict application of rules 
of evidence. In the context of a forfeiture by wrongdoing hearing, the 
strict application of rules of evidence is most relevant to whether or 
not the prosecution could use the hearsay statement of the victim or 
witness alleging intimidation to prove intimidation. Initially, because 
a forfeiture by wrongdoing hearing is a pre-trial hearing out of the 
presence of the jury, it may seem logical to use informal rules of 
evidence. However, the real question is: if ultimately it is 
unconstitutional to use hearsay, can hearsay be used in a hearing to 
determine whether hearsay can be used? 
That question should be answered in the negative. Certainly, a 
significant question exists as to whether a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation extends, in full force, to pre-trial 
preliminary hearings. 357 When the failure to extend the Sixth 
Amendment confrontation right to a pre-trial proceeding will likely 
detrimentally impact a defendant's ability to effectively cross-
examine witnesses at trial, the full scope of the Confrontation Clause 
should be available at the pre-trial hearing. 358 Moreover, some courts 
355. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 
U.S. 197,202 (1977)). 
356. See Moon v. Luoma, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63653, at * 19 (D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2007). 
357. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52-53 (1987) (drawing distinctions 
between pretrial and trial proceedings in a Confrontation Clause analysis); McCray v. 
Illinois, 386 U.S. 300,311-13 (1967) (holding that there is no confrontation right to 
learn name of confidential informant at pretrial hearing); People v. Felder, 129 P.3d 
\072, 1073-74 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining that Crawford did not apply to 
pretrial hearings and defendant had no Confrontation Clause right to cross-examine 
confidential informant at pretrial suppression hearing). 
358. See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 738 n.9, 740 (1987) (holding that the relevant 
inquiry in deciding whether defendant's right to confrontation is violated is "whether 
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have recognized that a defendant has the right, through the 
Confrontation Clause, to be present and confront witnesses during 
pre-trial deposition testimony if the deposition is intended for use at 
trial. 359 Similarly, the same rights should attach in a pre-trial hearing 
when the purpose is to determine what non-confrontable hearsay 
testimony may be used at trial against a defendant. 
In addition, one should consider the implications of allowing a 
defendant to be stripped of the core constitutional right to 
confrontation based on hearsay testimony alone. How can a 
defendant successfully challenge a witness's hearsay statement that 
alleges intimidation when it comes down to a credibility contest 
between a defendant and the witness? What if a witness has 
fabricated the claim that a defendant intimidated the witness into 
failing to testify? How can a defendant be protected against the 
possibility of an overreaching or overzealous prosecutor who may 
interpret a witness's hesitation about testifying as full-fledged 
intimidation, and encourage a witness to allege intimidation and 
profit from a forfeiture proceeding in which hearsay is allowed? 
How can a defendant be protected against the statements of a 
hyperbolic witness without the possibility of cross-examination? The 
potential for abuse, when juxtaposed against the rights that are at 
stake, requires that the right to confrontation be preserved at the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing hearing. Confrontation rights are a 
"bedrock procedural guarantee,,360 that ensures the inherent reliability 
of the process, and the denial to a defendant of this guarantee should 
only be undertaken after the strictest of standards are met. 
As to the fourth question regarding the burden of persuasion, the 
resolution of the forfeiture by wrongdoing issue may well decide the 
ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. If the court finds wrongdoing by 
a defendant, then exceedingly negative hearsay evidence will be 
admitted without the opportunity for cross-examination. On the other 
excluding the defendant from the hearing interferes with his opportunity for effective 
cross-examination"); United States v. Hodge, 19 F.3d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(upholding the right to cross-examine government witnesses in pre-trial suppression 
hearings because such hearings are critical stages of the prosecution that affect a 
defendant's substantial rights); State v. Rivera, 166 P.3d 488, 494 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2007) (holding the "[d]efendant's right to confrontation was violated by State's 
presentation of double hearsay evidence on the key issue in the suppression 
hearing"). See Joshua Deahl, Note, Expanding Forfeiture Without Sacrificing 
Confrontation After Crawford, 104 MICH. L. REv. 599, 623-24 (2005) (discussing the 
potential need to re-envision application of confrontation rights in pre-trial hearings 
post-Crawford in order to give "the confrontation right meaning at trial"). 
359. See Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 465 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994). 
360. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,42 (2004). 
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hand, if there is a finding of no wrongdoing, the prosecution will 
have a weaker case or no case at all. What risk of error in that fact 
finding process can be tolerated-about 30% under clear and 
convincin~ evidence, or as high as 49% under preponderance of the 
evidence? 61 The Supreme Court has indicated that admissibility 
rulings based on applications of the exclusionary rule regarding 
search and seizure evidence or the voluntariness of confessions are 
constitutional if based on the preponderance of the evidence 
standard. 362 Why should a pre-trial hearing on the applicability of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing be treated to a different standard? 
The answer is that if a defendant loses on a motion to suppress, the 
defendant still has the opportunity to attack the challenged evidence 
at trial by testing it in the crucible of cross-examination, including the 
officers who obtained the evidence. When a defendant loses in a 
forfeiture by wrongdoing hearing, the defendant loses entirely the 
ability to challenge what may be the most damaging evidence against 
the defendant by cross-examining the maker of the statement. 
Furthermore, as the Washington Supreme Court recognized in 
Mason, unlike other pre-trial evidentiary determinations involving 
constitutional rights, "forfeiture by wrongdoing is unique in that the 
trial judge must often rule on the ultimate question: did the accused 
kill the alleged victim?,,363 
B. Recommendation #2: If the Constitution Does Not Mandate the 
Maryland System, as Explained in this Article, Individual 
Jurisdictions Should Adopt the Maryland System by Statute, by 
Rule of Court, or by Case Law 
State courts are free to interpret state constitutional provisions to 
provide greater (but not lesser) constitutional protections than those 
mandated by the Federal Constitution. 364 In addition, states are free 
through their legislatures to codify evidentiary procedures, and if 
those procedures provide greater (but not lesser) rights than the 
United· States Constitution based on state statutes and constitutions, 
they are not subject to constitutional review by the Supreme Court. 365 
361. See Aaron R. Petty, Proving Forfeiture and Bootstrapping Testimony After 
Crawford, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 593, 602-06 (2007) (discussing decisions in 
support of a clear and convincing evidence standard). 
362. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 484, 488-89 (1972). 
363. 162 P.2d 396, 404 (Wash. 2007) (en banc). 
364. Arizona v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 1,8 (1995); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038-
40 (1983). 
365. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1039 nA. 
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In the context of confrontation rights, some states have afforded 
greater rights under their state constitutions than under the Federal 
Constitution. For example, in People v. Fitzpatrick,366 the Supreme 
Court of Illinois declined to find constitutional, despite the Supreme 
Court's holding in Maryland v. Craig, a state statute that permitted 
child abuse victims to testify by way of closed-circuit television, and 
instead expressly chose to provide greater confrontation rights under 
its state constitution. 367 Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 368 
the Supreme Court of ~ennsylvania decided that, under its state 
constitution, use of closed-circuit television testimony by an alleged 
child victim violated the confrontation clause of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution and expressly gave its citizens more rights than those 
provided under Craig. 369 
C. Recommendation #3: If the Court is Otherwise Persuaded to 
Adopt the Maryland System, But is Hesitant to do so Because of 
the Practical Realities of Prosecution, the Court Should Promote 
a "Compromise" Approach 
The Court may be concerned that, if the Constitution requires a 
hearing governed by strict rules of evidence and a clear and 
convincing burden of persuasion standard, the prosecution would 
rarely, if ever, prevail on the issue of forfeiture by wrongdoing. 
There is a compromise that may balance both a defendant's right to 
confrontation and the prosecution's need to litigate forfeiture by 
wrongdoing. 
In Maryland v. Craig, by a vote of 5-to-4, the Supreme Court held 
that, although face-to-face confrontation at trial is preferred, it is not 
mandated and may give way to public policy considerations if there 
is a "case-specific finding of necessity" for alternative procedures. 370 
In Craig, the Court upheld placing the witness in another location, 
with testimony sent in by one-way closed-circuit television (such that 
the defendant could see the witness, but the witness could not see the 
defendant),37I when evidence establishes that such a procedure "is 
366. 633 N.E.2d 685 (Ill. 1994). 
367. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 688-89. 
368. Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 594 A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991). 
369. Id. at 281-82. 
370. 497 U.S. 836, 849-50, 860 (1990). 
371. Subsequent cases have applied the Craig test for admissibility of such evidence in 
cases dealing with both one-way and two-way video conference, concluding that one-
way and two-way video conference trial testimony falls short of full face-to-face 
confrontation and can only be admissible under the Sixth Amendment after a Craig 
analysis determining both that there are public policy considerations and that such 
testimony is necessary under the particular facts of the case. See United States v. 
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necessary to protect the welfare" of the witness. 372 The witness 
testified live and was subject to cross-examination, but the defendant 
and the witness did not come face-to-face. 373 The Supreme Court 
found that Maryland's statute preserved all other elements of the right 
to confrontation by requiring that the witness be competent, testify 
under oath, and be subjected to contemporaneous cross-examination 
in front of the finder of fact. 374 
The holding in Craig may offer a "compromise" that both protects 
the spirit of Confrontation Clause rights in forfeiture by wrongdoing 
proceedings and allow prosecutors more leeway to use the testimony 
of a witness who alleges intimidation. In Craig, actual confrontation, 
though recognized as important, was not an absolute requirement and 
could yield "only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to 
further an important public policy and only where the reliability of 
the testimony is otherwise assured.,,375 Under Craig's analysis, if the 
trial court determines, on a case-by-case basis, that a child will 
experience trauma if confronted face-to-face by a defendant, the 
Confrontation Clause permits closed-circuit television to receive 
certain testimony.376 
Craig has not been overturned, even after Crawford v. Washington. 
Although Craig's application has been codified in most States in the 
context of protecting child witnesses,377 Craig left open the 
possibility that a state may use the Craig procedure if it demonstrates 
that its use is necessary to support an important state interest. 378 In 
that way, Craig was not expressly limited to child witnesses, but its 
critical inquiry was the State's interest in protecting a child 
witness. 379 The critical inquiry in a forfeiture by wrongdoing case 
Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2006) (discussing the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, 
and Tenth Circuit applications of Craig to deal with the admissibility of two-way 
video testimony). 
372. Craig, 497 U.S. at 855. 
373. ld. at 851. 
374. ld. 
375. ld. at 850. 
376. ld. at 857-58. 
377. For a summary of states with legislation allowing special provisions for child 
testimony under Craig, see 1. Steven Beckett & Steven D. Stennett, The Elder 
Witness-The Admissibility of Closed Circuit Television Testimony After Maryland v. 
Craig, 7 ELDERL.1. 313, 332 n.151 (1999). 
378. Craig, 497 U.S. at 852. 
379. ld. 
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would be the State's interest in protecting a witness alleging 
intimidation. 380 
Arguably, under Craig, if a state finds that the protection of adult 
rape victims, victims with disabilities, or elderly crime victims is an 
important public policy, a prosecutor should be able to make the case 
for Crai.~;-approved testimony via one way-closed circuit 
television. 81 This may overlook the key differences between 
developmental abilities of adult witnesses and child witnesses that 
formed, in part, the basis of the Craig Court's determination that the 
State had a particular interest in protecting vulnerable child 
witnesses. 382 Nonetheless, the scope of Craig, narrowly defined, 
may perhaps be of use in protecting victims or witnesses in the 
context of a forfeiture proceeding. 383 
If states adopt, by statute, a Craig-like procedure for litigation of 
forfeiture of Confrontation Clause rights, enabling witnesses to avoid 
directly facing a defendant by testifying via one-way closed-circuit 
television, if based on case-specific findings of necessity, such a 
procedure may ensure a proper balance between a defendant's rights 
under the Confrontation Clause and the practical realities of litigating 
issues of forfeiture by wrongdoing. 
A cautionary note should be added here. The case-specific 
determination would require a finding that the witness would be 
traumatized specifically by the Rresence of the defendant (not just the 
atmosphere of the courtroom), 84 and that the distress to the witness 
related to a face-to-face confrontation with the defendant would be 
"more than de minimus.,,385 
Proponents of allowing the use of the witness' hearsay statements 
in forfeiture by wrongdoing proceedings are likely to argue that this 
compromise is limited in scope, in large part because a witness 
alleging intimidation may not want a defendant to know that he or 
she has testified at all against a defendant, and that the manner of 
testimony, i.e., in the courtroom where a defendant can see the 
380. See id. 
381. Lisa Hamilton Thielmeyer, Note, Beyond Maryland v. Craig: Can and Should Adult 
Rape Victims be Permitted to TestifY by Closed-Circuit Television?, 67 IND. LJ. 797, 
810 (1992); Beckett & Stennett, supra note 377, at 338-39. 
382. Craig, 497 U.S. at 852. For a discussion of the public policy reasons supporting 
"tender years" statutes, such as those upheld in Craig, see Lynn McLain, Children 
are Losing Maryland's "Tender Years" War, 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 21,25-29 (1997). 
383. Craig, 497 U.S. at 852. 
384. Id. at 856. 
385. Id. (quoting Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 524, 530 A.2d 275, 289 (1987)). 
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witness and vice versa, or via closed-circuit television where only the 
defendant can see the witness, does not adequately address that fear. 
Nonetheless, the Craig-like compromise may provide some 
witnesses with an appropriate alternative, as the possibility of not 
having to face a defendant allegedly involved in intimidation may 
provide enough of a safe space for a witness to come forward and 
testify. In addition, this compromise is in keeping with the need to 
provide sufficient constitutional guarantees of confrontation at the 
forfeiture hearing, including an opportunity for contemporaneous 
cross-examination, and for the defendant to view the witness. Any 
compromise that completely vitiates the constitutional rights of a 
defendant would be no compromise at all. 
Another possible compromise approach can be found in the 
Maryland forfeiture by wrongdoing statute itself. 386 The Maryland 
statutes limits witness out-of-court statements that may be admitted at 
trial under the forfeiture doctrine to those that are: (1) under oath, (2) 
in a signed writing, or (3) recorded. 387 The statute provides: 
A statement may not be admitted under this section unless: 
(1) [t]he statement was: (i) [g]iven under oath subject to the 
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or 
in a deposition; (ii) [r]educed to writing and signed by the 
declarant; or (iii) [r]ecorded in substantially verbatim 
fashion by stenographic or electronic means 
contemporaneously with the making of the statement .... 388 
It may be a viable option for state legislatures to consider creating a 
hearsay exception for hearsay statements that can be used at a 
forfeiture hearing, and mandating that any hearsay statements used at 
the hearing must pass the dictates of Crawford, i.e., not testimonial 
and the witness is unavailable, which would include an unavailable 
victim's passing statement to a friend about intimidation, provided it 
fell under an acceptable exception to the rule against hearsay, and/or 
if they are given under oath in prior trial, hearing, or deposition, 
reduced to writing and signed by the declarant, or recorded in 
substantially verbatim fashion. This measure of reliability in a 
statement may be enough to create a narrow exception in the context 
of a forfeiture hearing to the application of strict rules of evidence. 
This, however, must be considered with great caution. The strength 
of confrontation rights lies in part in the fact that a witness may not 
386. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-901 (LexisNexis 2006). 
387. !d. § 10-901 (c)(I). 
388. Id. 
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be as willing to fabricate or exaggerate testimony when confronted 
face-to-face with the defendant. The possibility that a witness could 
opt-out of this face-to-face confrontation may open up the same 
potential for abuse as simply allowing in hearsay statements. 
In the end, no matter the approach, forfeiture by wrongdoing needs 
to be addressed by the Supreme Court. The Court should address the 
issues presented in this article and, at a minimum, produce a 
framework for a national consensus of constitutional dimension. 
Crawford represented a move forward in strengthening Sixth 
Amendment confrontation rights. Forfeiture by wrongdoing 
represents a way to ensure defendants do not profit from those rights 
by exploiting the system through their own misconduct. At the same 
time, forfeiture by wrongdoing should not represent a way to arrest 
the movement forward initiated by Crawford. Maryland's approach 
best ensures Crawford's confrontation protections while allowing 
space for the forfeiture doctrine, and can and should be a model 
applied at the national level. 
